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Sending the Bureaucracy to War
Elena A. Baylis and David Zaring
Abstract
Administrative law has been transformed after 9/11, much to its detriment. Since
then, the government has mobilized almost every part of the civil bureaucracy to
fight terrorism, including agencies that have no obvious expertise in that task. The
vast majority of these bureaucratic initiatives suffer from predictable, persistent,
and probably intractable problems - problems that contemporary legal scholars
tend to ignore, even though they are central to the work of the writers who created
and framed the discipline of administrative law.
We analyze these problems through a survey of four administrative initiatives that
exemplify the project of sending bureaucrats to war. The initiatives - two involving
terrorism financing, one involving driver licensing, and one involving the adjudi-
cation of asylum claims - grow out of the two statutes perhaps most associated
with the war on terrorism, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and the REAL ID Act
of 2005. In each of our case studies, the civil administrative schemes used to fight
terrorism suffer from the incongruity of fitting civil rules into an anti-civil project,
the difficulties of delegating wide discretion without adequate supervision, and
the problem of using inexpert civil regulators to serve complex law enforcement
ends. We conclude that anti-terrorism should rarely be the principal justification
for a new administrative initiative, but offer some recommendations as to when it
might make sense to re-purpose civil officials as anti-terrorism fighters.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The war against terrorism is transforming our bureaucracy, and it is 
transforming it badly.  Since 9/11, the government has mobilized not just its 
national security apparatus, but almost all of the myriad units of the federal 
civil administrative state to battle against a small and elusive foe.1  Officials 
like state department of motor vehicles (DMV) employees and federal 
banking regulators have no obvious expertise in counter-terrorism.  
Nevertheless, in DMVs, in the Treasury Department, and in many, many 
other unlikely venues, all of the usual indicators of bureaucratic action – 
rulemakings, adjudications, licensing, and civil enforcement actions – have 
been put to the new and uneasy service of national security. In this article, 
we argue that the vast majority of these civil bureaucratic initiatives in the 
war against terrorism suffer from predictable, persistent, and probably 
intractable problems. 
Everyone agrees that we should fight terrorism.  The question is 
how we should do it – and who we should use for the job.  While the debate 
over the war on terrorism thus far has focused on questions of civil liberties 
and executive authority, other fundamental questions have been overlooked: 
do our civil administrative agencies make effective, efficient foot soldiers in 
this war?  Or, in transforming our bureaucracy to become a fighting unit, 
are we undermining its ability to serve the vital, if more prosaic, purposes 
for which it was intended?   
A sober reevaluation of the costs and benefits of the approach the 
                                                 
∗ Assistant Professor, Washington & Lee University School of Law. 
? Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.  Thanks to Francesca Bignami, Darryl 
Brown, Montre’ Carodine, Susan Franck, Amanda Frost, Brandon Garrett, Jeffrey Lubbers, Michael Madison, 
John Parry, Melissa Waters, and participants at workshops at Boston College, University of Pittsburgh, SEALS, 
and Washington & Lee.  Thanks also to James Lin, Taylor Menlove and Jeremy Seeman for research assistance 
and to the Frances Lewis Law Center for research support. 
1 As Rosa Brooks has observed, “Al Qaeda knows no borders, and its operatives wear no uniforms, 
operating by stealth more often than they operate openly.”  Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, 
National Security Law, And The Law Of Armed Conflict In The Age Of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 710 
(2004); see also CLIVE WALKER, BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE TO THE ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION x (2002) 
(defining terrorism like that practiced by al Qaeda as emerging "through non-national, global networks and with 
aspirations which are likewise distanced from place and time"). 
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government has taken since 9/11 is overdue, particularly in light of the all-
encompassing nature of the administrative anti-terrorism campaign. Almost 
every federal department and agency has adopted an anti-terrorism policy or 
initiative.  The most mundane of state and local agencies have been asked to 
transform themselves into security providers and law enforcers.    
Pursuant to the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (the “Patriot Act”),2 
passed shortly after 9/11 and recently reauthorized, financial regulators in 
the Department of the Treasury have passed rules, engaged in enforcement 
actions, and taken over American organizations in an effort to disrupt 
terrorist financing.3  Pursuant to the REAL ID Act of 2005,4 immigration 
adjudicators have been given broad, barely reviewable discretion to make 
asylum determinations with an eye to keeping terrorists out of the United 
States, and state motor vehicle departments have been tasked with new 
responsibilities for limiting access to drivers’ licenses.5 
In this article, we survey some of the bureaucratic initiatives taken 
on the authority of these two statutes and identify three characteristic 
problems with these efforts.6   These problems test the capacity of the 
administrative state, and in doing so, tell us something about how that state 
works, especially how it works when tasked with unconventional new 
intiatives. 
First, we identify the problem of fit, that is, the problem of using 
civil rules to find and deter terrorists – perhaps the quintessential non-civil 
actors.  Administrative agencies tend to do their jobs in one of two ways: by 
creating rules of general applicability that govern the public at large, such as 
through a tax collection or driver’s licensing regime; or by extending a 
benefit in exchange for voluntary cooperation such as granting licenses to 
financial institutions in return for voluntary compliance with reporting 
requirements.7  These typical modes of action are ill suited to reach 
                                                 
2 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified across the U.S. Code) 
[hereinafter the “Patriot Act”]. 
3 See Part III, infra. 
4 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 302 (to be codified across Titles 8 and 49 
U.S.C.). 
5 See Part II, infra. 
6 In doing so, we study three traditional forms of administration.  But perhaps because of the difficulties of 
employing traditional administrative procedure to combat terrorism, new methods of administration have also 
been employed: networks of domestic and foreign officials to harmonize and coordinate law enforcement 
approaches and privatization of enforcement – mobilizing banks for asset freezes and monitoring.  Indeed, as 
Anne-Marie Slaughter has noted, networks might be one of the more effective ways to determine “how to mesh 
antiterrorism legislation to minimize loopholes" in a multilateral world.  ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW 
WORLD ORDER 208 (2004).  We accordingly examine a more networked mechanism of administration in Part IV, 
infra. 
7 James Landis himself noted that the New Deal agencies he helped to design and justify were focused on “a 
general social and economic problem which cut across a vast number of businesses and occupations.”  JAMES 
LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 17 (1938).  And contemporary observers continue to agree: 
“Government mandates and rulemaking generally apply across the board to individuals and businesses within 
broad categories.”  Business Roundtable, Government since 9/11 33, available at 
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terrorists who can opt out of regimes that depend on voluntary participation 
and who comprise a tiny segment of the public as a whole.8   These 
problems of scale and coverage make the efforts to detect and deter 
terrorists something very different than customary bureaucratic work.   
We argue that, as a result, bureaucracy is almost always unfit to do counter-
terrorism.9   
Second, these anti-terrorist measures go to extraordinary lengths to 
privilege agency discretion, thereby reducing agency accountability and, 
predictably, resulting in increasingly arbitrary, unreviewable agency action.  
We call this the problem of overdiscretion.  It is a maxim of administrative 
law that the authority delegated to administrative agencies should be paired 
with safeguards on the abuse of that authority.10  Accordingly, 
administrative agencies have traditionally operated publicly and openly and 
usually pursuant to a tested and established framework of rules.11  Agency 
rule-making is governed by requirements for public notice and comment,12 
while agency adjudication is subject to judicial review or, at a minimum, to 
supervision by senior executive branch officials.13  But the administrative 
initiatives against terror routinely reduce what have traditionally been 
participatory, reviewable rule-making or adjudicatory processes to singular 
acts of discretion that are often undertaken in secret and thus effectively 
insulated from public view and from judicial, or even supervisory review.  
Furthermore, these measures often place this decision-making authority in 
the hands of mid-level or even street level bureaucrats, such as office 
directors in the Department of the Treasury in the case of the terrorist 
financing programs, or low level state employees in the case of the driver’s 
                                                                                                                            
http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/conference/2003/NewFrontier/BusRoundtable_cba.pdf. 
8 Cf. 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY & SOCIETY 212 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich, eds. 1968) (1921) 
("[E]very genuine form of domination implies a minimum of voluntary compliance") 
9 Nor are fit problems purely those belonging to the United States.  See, for example, Lorne Sossen, The 
Intersection of Administrative Law with the Anti-Terrorism Bill, THE SECURITY OF FREEDOM 419-434 (R. Daniels 
et al., eds. 2001) (discussing the relationship between anti-terrorism initiatives and administrative law in Canada). 
10 See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1675-79 (1975) 
(“[T]he courts, reacting in part to the Administrative Procedure Act and its history, [have] turned to a number of . . 
. techniques to control the exercise of administrative discretion [including] by undertaking a more searching 
scrutiny of the substantiality of the evidence supporting agency factfinding and by insisting on a wider range of 
procedural safeguards. . . . require[ing] reasoned consistency in agency decisionmaking. . . . [and] demand[ing] a 
clear statement of legislative purpose as a means of restraining the range of agency choice when fundamental 
individual liberties were at risk.” (footnotes omitted)).  See generally 1 Kenneth Culp Davis, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW TREATISE 210-12 (1978). 
11 Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Incomplete Law, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 931, 949 (2003) 
(“[R]egulators make and enforce law both ex post and ex ante”); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of 
Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 91 (1983) (“Transparency is usually bought at the price of incongruity or 
ex ante rulemaking costs”); see also, Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking, 
and Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis,  71 U. CHI. L. REV. 933, 1000 (Summer 2004) (“Indeed, agencies already 
seek to improve the objectivity of their analyses by providing rigid ex ante rules for measuring costs and 
benefits.”) 
12 For which the Administrative Procedure Act famously provides.  See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). 
13 5 U.S.C. § 554.   
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license programs created by the REAL ID Act.14  The allocation of 
discretion down to bureaucrats all but insulated from oversight has, at least 
in the case of anti-terrorism regulation, become a license for arbitrariness.  
Third, antiterrorism regulation has expanded agency powers to 
regulate beyond areas of agency expertise.  Since 9/11, our bureaucracy has 
folded new industries into its regulatory purview and has adopted new 
investigative and rulemaking responsibilities – often responsibilities that are 
difficult to distinguish from criminal law enforcement.  Max Weber posited 
that bureaucracies would develop rational and task-specific expertises.15  
But the new anti-terrorism responsibilities of agencies have ignored this 
Weberian maxim.  Instead, agencies have been tasked with uncharacteristic, 
non-civil responsibilities, and have been told to do so without supervision.  
The result has been predictably inexpert.  
As a result of the problems of fit, overdiscretion, and inexpertise, 
agencies asked to fight the war on terror consistently miss their targets. In 
fact, the fit between bureaucratic methods of regulation and terrorist 
patterns of behavior is so poor that civil bureaucrats typically do not even 
try to target terrorists directly.  Instead, they target proxy groups in the 
hopes that somewhere among those proxies, terrorists may be found.  The 
predictable result has been that these initiatives have burdened proxy 
groups, not terrorists.  This proxy problem, as we call it, means that the 
administrative war on terror overwhelmingly burdens law abiders who 
willingly participate in civil administrative schemes.16 
In this article, we first look at classical and modern theories of the 
purpose of administrative law, and consider what they have to tell us about 
the administrative war on terror.  As a matter of scholarship, we think that 
the currently ascendant focus on the political choices made by agencies, and 
by those who delegate authority to them, overlooks vital questions of 
competence that occupied scholars like Weber and the mid-century legal 
process theorists.  The conceptualization of administrative-law-as-political-
arena fails to provide us with traction on important questions like whether 
administrative law is an appropriate way to pursue counter-terrorism.   
Because the competence theorists understood that the justification 
                                                 
14 We borrow the term from MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980), a landmark study evaluating the policy-making done by the lowest level 
government employees, such as the police or social workers. 
15 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY & SOCIETY 217-21 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich, eds. 1968) (1921) (setting 
forth the principles of “legal authority with a bureaucratic staff,” which resulted in, inter alia, the “rule bound 
conduct of official business,” “specialized training” for government employees, and a “specialized sphere of 
competence” for administrators). 
16   Of course, it may be that Americans are willing to accept certain levels or types of false positives -- for 
example, that Americans feel it is worth over-restricting immigration from countries likely to produce terrorists.  
But in our efficiency and effectiveness oriented analysis of the bureaucratic war on terror, we find that the level of 
false positives in these systems is quite high indeed, and that the cost of adapting task-specific civil administration 
to deal with terrorists is accordingly much larger than it might, at first blush, seem to be.  
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for administrative action depends on a careful analysis of its prospects for 
success, we then offer a relatively thick description of four characteristic 
initiatives authorized by the Patriot and REAL ID Acts that exemplify the 
project of sending bureaucrats to war.   
We analyze the costs and benefits of the mobilization of the broad 
panoply of administrative process pursuant to both statutes – rulemakings, 
enforcement actions, adjudications, and licensings – and show how the 
three paradigmatic problems of fit, overdiscretion, and inexpertise 
characterize the efforts of the DMVs, the Citizenship and Immigration 
branch of the Department of Homeland Security, and the Treasury 
Department, to implement their new mandates.  We also survey some of the 
many other initiatives that agencies have taken since 9/11 to prosecute the 
war on terror to give readers a sense of the breadth of the phenomenon.  We 
conclude with some recommendations about the appropriate place to locate 
administrative counterterrorism initiatives.17   
Ordinary civil agencies are simply not very effective at fighting 
terrorism.  Accordingly, anti-terrorism should very rarely be the principal 
justification for a new administrative initiative, although it is possible that 
some narrow terrorism-directed rules – locking cockpit doors, for example – 
will make sense.  The better course for regulators and lawmakers, however, 
is not to look first to a proposed rule’s purported effect on terrorism, but to 
ask whether the rule promotes some end that furthers the agency’s 
regulatory responsibilities.  If so – if antiterrorism benefits are incidental – 
then the rule may be justified, and the problems we have identified may be 
avoided.  But if not, then the repurposing of a civil agency to wage war on 
terror should be viewed skeptically.  We hope in the future that 
congressional oversight committees and senior executive officials will take 
the problems of administration seriously before ordering civil agencies to 
take on the uncomfortable and novel roles of soldiers of counter-terrorism. 
 
I. THEORIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE WAR ON TERROR 
 
Our critique draws upon the work of classical theorists of 
administrative law, such as Max Weber and Henry Hart, as well as more 
contemporary commentators such as Colin Diver, who have identified the 
characteristics that enable agencies to function effectively: expertise and 
discretion bounded by oversight.  What these observers understood, and 
what has been obscured by the rush to send civil agencies to war, is that a 
judgment about the legitimacy of agency action should be bounded not only 
by questions of political oversight and delegation, transparency, and 
democratic accountability, but also by a thick view of how agencies actually 
                                                 
17 See Part IV infra. 
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function, of what they are capable, and how they are structured.  In this, our 
focus is primarily on the period and process of implementation, rather than 
on the moment or process of delegation: that is, it is our assertion that a 
crucial test of agency legitimacy is agency effectiveness.  In this we stand 
with Alexander Hamilton, who posited over two hundred years ago that 
“the true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a 
good administration.”18 
Our case studies also stand as a counterpoint, and perhaps even a 
challenge, to much of the leading work justifying delegation to agencies, 
which tends to focus on political control rather than capacity as the 
fundamental test of the legitimacy of agency action; or at least so we will, 
somewhat tendentiously, argue.  Our survey of this literature thus posits a 
transformation from theories of administration that have based the 
legitimacy of agencies on their capacity and expertise, to an approach that 
rests legitimacy on the political process of agency control.  In the 
scholarship on the administration of the war on terror, this has meant that 
most observers have been thinking about political control of the war-
fighting executive, rather than about the capabilities of executive agencies 
in helping to fight that war. 
 
A. Expertise And Discretion In Classical Theory 
 
Classical theorists of public administration evaluated its merit based 
on its capacity.  Max Weber, although principally a describer, rather than a 
defender, of modern bureaucratic process, praised the agency as a 
mechanism for adopting rationalized, task-specific, expert, and 
depersonalized approaches to modern problems and depoliticizing the task 
of regulation. “The needs of mass administration make it today completely 
indispensable.  The choice is only between bureaucracy and dilettantism in 
the field of administration.”19  The legal process school that played such an 
important role in mid-century administrative law accepted and built upon 
the Weberian notion of bureaucratic expertise by focusing its attention on 
the competencies and division of authority between courts and agencies.20  
James Landis argued that the purpose of agencies was to provide expert 
                                                 
18 THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton). 
19 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY & SOCIETY 224 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich, eds. 1968) (1921).   As 
Wolfgang Mommsen has explained, in Weber’s view, “[r]ational, consistent, bureaucratic rule based on a division 
of labor and strictly defined areas of responsibility was a more effective means of government than all historically 
successful forms of the exercise of power,” though, of course, Weber wasn’t always sure that this was such a good 
thing.  WOLFGANG J. MOMMSEN, MAX WEBER AND GERMAN POLITICS 166 (1984 TR. MICHAEL S. STEINBERG). 
20 Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health Law And Administrative Law: A Marriage Most Convenient, 49 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 1, 16-17 (2004) (symposium issue) (citing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, 
INTRODUCTION TO HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW li, lx-lxii (1994); Keith Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative 
Law, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 567, 577-79 (1992).) 
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supervision of the complicated problems and externalities presented by the 
modern economy.21  
Expertise alone neither described nor justified the administrative 
state, however.  Weber and the legal process scholars who followed him 
also emphasized the importance of organizational charts and the balance 
between discretion and oversight that they signified.  To Weber, 
bureaucracies characteristically featured systems of supervision and 
subordination, and in this, few modern administrative scholars would 
disagree.22  He stressed that government functions could only be 
coordinated and rationalized on the basis of regular recording and review of 
decisions and rules.23  And legal process theorists took a similar view of the 
importance of organization.  In this vein, Henry Hart declared that “each 
agency of decision ought to make those decisions which its position in the 
institutional structure best fits it to make.”24   As Dan Tarlock has said, 
“The great project of modern administrative law has been to cabin the 
exercise of agency discretion.”25   
In the United States, much of this supervision has been provided by 
judges.  In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that the study of judicial review 
of discretionary decisions by agencies is at the very center of administrative 
law, and has occupied scholars since passage of the Administrative 
Procedure Act shortly after World War II.26  The prerogative of supervision 
is also one that the courts themselves have jealously guarded.27  
To the New Dealers, court supervision was never meant to be 
absolute, but nor was it meant to be perfunctory.  Thurman Arnold’s 
preference for granting agencies relatively unbounded discretion to act in 
                                                 
21 JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 19 (1938).   
22 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY & SOCIETY 217, 221 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich, eds. 1968) (1921) (“the 
typical person in authority, the ‘superior,’ is himself subject to an impersonal order by orienting his actions to it  
in his own dispositions and commands….[T]he person who obeys authority does so, as it is usually stated, only in 
his capacity as a ‘member’ of the organization and he obeys only the law,” and the bureaucrat is “subject to strict 
and systematic discipline and control in the conduct of the office.”). 
23 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY & SOCIETY 219 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich, eds. 1968) (1921) 
(“Administrative acts, decisions, and rules are formulated and recorded in writing, even in cases where oral 
discussion is the rule or is even mandatory. … The combination of written documents and a continuous operation 
by officials constitutes the office which is the central focus of all types of modern organized action.”) 
24 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 426 (1958). 
25  A. Dan Tarlock, A First Look At A Modern Legal Regime For A "Post-Modern" United States Army 
Corps Of Engineers, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1285, 1313 (2004); see also Terrence Dantith, Contractual Discretion 
and Administrative Discretion: A Unified Analysis, 68 MODERN L. REV. 554 (2005) (providing a theoretical 
justification for constraining agencies as a matter of contract). 
26 Not every theorist agrees, of course.  Edward Rubin’s new work on Weber, Beyond Camelot, rejects a 
hierarchical model of the administrative state and posits a more networked approach to bureaucratic linkage.  See 
EDWARD RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT (2006). 
27 Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Presumption of Reviewability: A Study in Canonical Construction and Its 
Consequences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 743, 751-65 (1992) (noting that courts have a strong presumption in favor of 
reviewability); Stephen I. Vladeck, ???, __ Tulsa L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2007) (arguing that recent Supreme 
Court jurisprudence has encouraged the exercise of federal jurisdiction and carefully policed congressional 
attempts to limit that jurisdiction). 
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lieu of courts as task-specific doers of equity28 was rejected by Felix 
Frankfurter and other early New Deal scholars, who urged an important role 
for courts, one that allocated oversight authority between courts and 
agencies on the basis of institutional competence.29   
To be sure, these organizers of authority between courts and 
agencies found, as Colin Diver has suggested, that institutional competence 
may be a “terribly plastic” concept. 30  Nontheless, to Diver and others, it 
remains “the only material we have” to make sense of the proper roles of 
agencies in the government.31   
Two of the three problems that we think are inherent in sending the 
bureaucracy to war – overdiscretion, and inexpertise – are accordingly ones 
that administrative lawyers will find familiar.  By commandeering civil 
agencies to pursue terrorists, our government has pushed agencies outside 
their Weberian mandate to be rationalized, expert, and ordered.  And in 
offering national security to serve as an unreviewable trump card 
unfettering agency discretion, our government has undermined the 
capability-based relationship between oversight and discretion that these 
theorists thought was important.   
Our claim about fit – which turns on the generality of civil 
administration – is, at least as applied here, pretty new, though we think it is 
related to Weber’s view that organization would mark much of modern life.  
To us, and perhaps to him, it is a function of the everyday of civil society, 
rather than the extraordinary acts of small and shadowy criminal 
enterprises. 
 
B. The Turn Towards Politics, and Away From Capacity  
 
 In recent scholarship, the focus of administrative law writers has not 
been on these classic questions of efficiency and effectiveness in 
implementation.  Rather, their work has privileged an earlier moment in 
agency action, the moment of delegation, and has focused on the question 
                                                 
28 Arnold rejected any fundamental or functional distinctions between the judiciary and agencies as 
institutions of governance except insofar as they served the symbolic dimensions of governance. He also showed 
little faith in process as a necessary and sufficient means to a functional administrative state. Rather, he saw 
procedural doctrines in the same way that a wily, creative attorney does: as a tool to move a decision maker to a 
desired outcome. Process, form, and structure were secondary to substantive policy and functional results.  Mark 
Fenster, The Birth Of A "Logical System": Thurman Arnold And The Making Of Modern Administrative Law, 84 
OR. L. REV. 69, 73 (2005). 
29 Id. at 124-28.  James Landis, for example, argued that “the advantages of specialization in the field of 
regulatory activity seem obvious enough” and that “the need for expertness has become dominant.”  JAMES 
LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 17 (1938).   
30 Colin S. Diver, Essay, Sound Governance And Sound Law (reviewing CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY). 89 MICH. L. REV. 1436, 1449  
(1991) (and concluding that institutional competence is a particularly appropriate lens to use when evaluating the 
institutional competences of courts and agencies). 
31 Id. 
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of political interests.  While these are important questions, in our view this 
movement in the scholarship has had two problematic effects: it has tended 
to ignore the agency’s implementation of its delegated authority and so has 
tended to distract scholars from the search for good administration, as 
opposed to democratically justifiable administration.   
This shift in perspective might be exemplified by Richard Stewart’s 
1975 article on the transformation of administrative law since the New 
Deal.32  Stewart showed how the New Deal revolutionized the purview of 
agencies by basing their legitimacy on their role as expert, task-specific 
regulators – a role that Weber and the legal process theorists understood.33  
But the expertise justification, Stewart argued, had given way to a much 
more political conception of an agency’s role, and to a corresponding 
judicial view of their process as one designed to represent the varied 
interests involved in any form of agency interaction.34   
Since Stewart, the politicized concept of agency action has informed 
the leading scholarly reconceptions of administrative law.  As a result, 
political theorists have focused their attention primarily on the moment of 
delegation and on the battle amongst competing political interests for the 
power to define agency goals.  Theorists do not agree where these 
competing interests resolve their disputes – the positive political theorists 
would probably point to Congress,35 while the presidentialists would look to 
the Presidency,36 while others concerned with the increasing prominence of 
privatized alternatives to traditional regulation might point to non-
regulatory actors.37  Stewart himself was concerned with judicial review. 
Positive political theorists (mostly, but not entirely, political 
scientists) have focused their attention on congressional control of agencies, 
and have addressed the competence of agencies to act through the lens of 
                                                 
32 Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 
(1975). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Positive political theorists, for example, have conceptualized the chief ways that Congress might supervise 
agencies in two ways: through "police patrol" and "fire alarm" oversight. Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive 
Political Dimensions of Regulatory Reform, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 1, 43 (1994) ( "Positive political theory describes 
regulatory policymaking as a part of a world in which political actors function within institutions rationally and 
strategically in order to accomplish certain goals."); see also Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, 
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 165 (1984). 
36 See Elena Kagan Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2246 (2001) ("[A]t different times, 
one [governmental entity] or another has come to the fore and asserted at least a comparative primacy in setting 
the direction and influencing the outcome of administrative process. In this time, that institution is the Presidency. 
We live today in an era of presidential administration.").; Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency 
Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 821, 883 (2003) ("[T]he White House clearly has 
used rulemaking review to put its own mark on particular agency rules increasingly often over the course of the 
past two decades, and at an accelerated pace during the Clinton administration."). 
37 See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 7 
(1997) (promoting negotiated regulation as collaborative process producing better outcomes than rulemaking); 
Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 Geo. L.J. 1, 31-42 (1982).. 
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the way that Congress would oversee that interaction.38  Presidentialists, on 
the other hand, have sited the political choices that agencies make with the 
president, and have characterized agency action as action subject to strong 
presidential control.39  Still others have sought to make agencies themselves 
the center of political disputes by privatizing the interest group 
representation process, either through negotiated regulation,40 or by opening 
up traditional areas of administration to contract and bidding by private 
parties.41  Stewart himself has suggested that he now prefers market-
oriented solutions to regulatory problems.42 
In our view, this entire debate addresses only one of the questions 
that needs to be asked when it comes to understanding and critiquing the 
delegation of authority to carry out vast agendas like counter-terrorism to 
unrelated federal agencies.  For while the question of the representation of 
executive, congressional and public interests in the war on terror is 
important, an equally important question is not what power is delegated to 
the agencies and how, but whether the agencies are an appropriate 
receptacle for that power.  And this debate that has dominated attempts to 
define administrative law for the last thirty years does not offer us any 
traction on that question. 
Furthermore, in each of these theories of the administrative state, the 
act of administration is conceived descriptively only in a thin way, as a 
purely political act.  The interest group representation model of agencies 
viewed them as task-specific political actors, whose work could be justified 
only through the participation of the plurality of interests affected by the 
                                                 
38 For an overview by an administrative scholar, see generally Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and 
the Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (1994).  McCubbins and his co-authors, as well as 
those who have followed them, have tended to conclude that congressional supervision of agencies is relatively 
effective.  Indeed, they have argued that administrative procedure, by requiring a certain level of disclosure of 
agencies, was enacted by a rational Congress concerned with ensuring the efficacy of fire-alarm-style oversight: 
Fire alarm oversight also requires that elected officials, once the fire alarm has sounded, investigate 
conflicting claims among constituent groups and an agency.  To undertake this function, elected 
officials must have ready access to relevant information . . . . The APA helps to ensure that this 
information is provided through the openness provisions and the requirement that agencies allow 
affected parties to participate. 
McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 180, 199 
(1990). 
39 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2246 (2001); Steven Croley, White 
House Review of Agency Rulemaking:  An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 883 (2003). 
40 See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, ADR and the Courts: An Update, 46 DUKE L.J. 1445, 1457 (1997).  Jody 
Freeman, supra note __, at 7, was another recent exponent of “reg-neg”, although Richard Stewart long ago 
considered the promise of the concept.  See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation and Administrative 
Law:  A Conceptual Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1256, 1341 (1981). 
41 See generally Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
1285 (2003) (noting trend toward privatization in recent decades); See Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing 
Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389 (2003). 
42 Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 451 (2003) 
(“Economic incentives are a logical next step …. Rather than using economic tools to discipline command 
regulators, [they] eliminate[] command regulation and use[] economic instruments to reconstitute the market itself 
for regulatory ends”). 
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charge given to agencies.   
To really understand and justify agency tasks, one cannot only focus 
on the polical aspect of who decides.  Discretion is not only a grant of 
political power, but also a claim to organized competence.  It is accordingly 
crucial to consider whether specific agencies can and do exercise the 
discretion they are given successfully to produce competent results.43  
Similarly, we should look at agency capabilities and expertise not merely as 
an expression of the competing interests of the represented public, but also 
as a function of efficiency and effectiveness.   
 
C.  War on Terror Scholarship: The Privileging of Politics and Rights 
 
American legal scholarship on the war on terror since 9/11 has 
focused primarily on the appropriate authority and roles of the executive, 
legislature, and judiciary, rather than on the agencies that make up our so-
called fourth branch.  Many scholars have grappled with the scope of 
executive power, as, for example, in Kim Lane Schepple’s critique of “ever-
expanding” exceptionalism, justifying executive overreaching during a time 
of perceived national emergency,44  and Rosa Brooks’ related indictment of 
unbounded executive claims to emergency powers as claims of “war 
everywhere,” even, we assume, in the traditional administrative state.45  
Other writers have expressed concerns about post-9/11 intrusions on civil 
liberties,46 and some have recognized that issues of institutional design, or a 
lack thereof in the case of broad delegations to the executive of terror-
fighting authority, have exacerbated the problems of rights-protection.47 
  This focus on unbridled executive has found a response in Cass 
Sunstein’s proposal that the most deferential doctrine of administrative law 
be used to bridle the executive – at least a little.  In, “Administrative Law 
Goes to War,” Sunstein asserts that “the logic of Chevron applies to the 
exercise of executive authority in the midst of war” and that principles of 
administrative law can help our governing institutions divide the powers to 
make war.48  Thus, Sunstein, is engaged in a different inquiry than ours: he 
                                                 
43 As Jerry Mashaw has explained, “from the perspective of bureaucratic rationality” – a perspective that we 
largely adopt – “administrative justice is accurate decisionmaking carried on through processes appropriately 
rationalized to take account of costs.”  JERRY MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 26 (1983). 
44 Kim Lane Scheppele, Law In A Time Of Emergency: States Of Exception And The Temptations Of 9/11,  6 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001, 1003 (2004). 
45 Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, And The Law Of Armed 
Conflict In The Age Of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 704 (2003). 
46 See, e.g., DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL 
LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY (2002). 
47 See, e.g., Brooks, supra note __, at 738.  MORE CITES HERE 
48 Sunstein, supra note __, at __.  Sunstein is concerned specifically with certain nondelegation questions 
raised by Jack Goldsmith and Curtis Bradley in their recent article on the constitutional and international law 
bases of the war on terrorism, Jack Goldsmith & Curtis Bradley, Congressional Authorization and the War on 
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. ____  (forthcoming 2006), available at 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art50
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is focusing on the military war in Iraq and the president’s powers to make it, 
whereas here we confront the question of how our government will use its 
bureaucracy to the end of fighting the far more loosely defined war on 
terror.49   
Similarly, some of those who have weighed in on the role of the 
judiciary in the war on terrorism have tackled the relationship between 
courts and executive agencies, while others have theorized about the 
appropriate role for courts in terror regulation through tort.50 Still others 
have focused on particular problems that various agencies have faced when 
tasked with terror-fighting responsibilities, ranging from agency-by-agency 
critiques to broader concerns that administrative principles of open 
governance have been changed since the attacks.51   
But these task- and issue-specific critiques address parts of the 
elephant.  The broader question – the one addressed in this paper – is how 
the government should be mobilized to fight terrorism.  Currently, it is a 
multi-front effort, including prosecutors, spies, and soldiers.  We ask 
whether civil bureaucrats should be added to the list of fighters, not as a 
matter of individual rights or government powers, but as a matter of 
capabilities.  These other questions, important as they are, can be answered 
only with an understanding of what is possible from the civil bureaucracy, 
rather than an image of what might be ideal. 
 
II.  THE REAL ID ACT:  ANTI-TERRORISM THROUGH ADJUDICATION 
 
In May 2005, Congress passed the REAL ID Act,52 legislation 
intended to “prevent another 9/11-type terrorist attack by disrupting terrorist 
travel.”53 Here, we focus on the two central aspects of the REAL ID Act 
                                                                                                                            
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=702502.  In their article, Goldsmith and Bradley argue that 
“Although nondelegation concerns should not play a significant role in interpreting the AUMF, a clear statement 
requirement is appropriate when the President takes actions under the AUMF that restrict the liberty of non-
combatants in the United States.” 
49 Nonetheless, this paper suggests that civil administration and war-making powers co-exist uneasily at best.  
We should be cautious, then, in assuming that the Chevron framework is the right one to use in analyzing 
warmaking authority.  Although Sunstein supposes that “In war no less than peace, the inquiry into the authority 
of the President can be organized and disciplined if it is undertaken with close reference to standard principles of 
administrative law,” it is by no means clear that the rules of bureaucracy will be will suited to decisions prompted 
by needs of security, as the sorts of regulation that they try to do are a bit different.  Sunstein, supra note __, at __. 
50 John C. Yoo, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism , 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ___ 
(forthcoming, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=461721.  Tung Yin, The 
Role of Article III Courts in the War on Terrorism, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1061 (2005).   While tort suits 
by victims constitute a form of regulation, they are one outside the scope of this paper, which focuses on the 
repurposing of agencies, rather than courts, and on government-initiated, rather that privately-initiated regulation.  
See, e.g.,  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=312451 
51 David A. Schulz, How The Government's Response To 9/11 May Close The Doors To Open 
Government, 20 COMM. LAW. 3, 3 (Winter, 2003). MORE CITES HERE TOO 
52REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005) (“REAL ID Act” or “the Act”) 
53  U.S. House of  Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, Sensenbrenner House Floor Statement on 
REAL ID Legislation (Feb. 9, 2005), available at http://judiciary.house/gov/newscenter.aspx?A=433 (Rep. 
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that seek to implement anti-terrorist measures through the machinery of the 
administrative state:  the new role imposed on state Department of Motor 
Vehicles (“DMVs”) in issuing driver’s licenses and the increased discretion 
given to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (“USCIS”) to turn 
away applicants for political asylum.54  
In so doing, Congress has enlisted two agencies that serve wide 
swaths of the public to seek out a handful of terrorists, has enrolled an 
agency with a very narrow expertise (the DMV) to conduct far more 
sweeping tasks, and has engaged an agency that has proved itself inept in 
applying its ostensible expertise (the USCIS) to act with greater discretion 
than ever before. In a sense, the Act is a statement of unfettered optimism 
that agencies that have never before exhibited the capability or judgment to 
carry out complex, sensitive tasks will nonetheless now rise to the 
challenge.  But from a more sober perspective, these measures seem at best 
misguided, at worst, counter-productive, and in any event, counter to basic 
principles of agency law.   
 
A.  State DMVs and Driver’s Licensing 
 
A state DMV may be one of the very few administrative agencies 
that virtually every American visits at least once or twice in their lives.  
America’s love affair with the automobile is legendary, but warm feelings 
aside, driving is a necessity for most Americans.  According to a 2002 
national survey, 95% of Americans have a driver’s license, and the other 
5% have an alternative DMV-issued ID.55  Driver’s licenses have become 
the most commonly used form of identification, whether for buying 
cigarettes or alcohol, cashing a check, or of course, boarding a plane.  For 
many Americans, the driver’s license is their only government-issued form 
of picture ID, making it the most important document in their possession, 
the one that enables them to go about every aspect of their daily lives.  
 
1. The New Regulatory Scheme 
 
With the REAL ID Act’s driver’s license mandates, Congress 
targeted agencies whose reform would palpably affect virtually every 
person in the United States. The REAL ID Act directs states to adopt three 
major groups of changes in issuing driver’s licenses:  
                                                                                                                            
Sensenbrenner sponsored the bill.); see also Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global 
War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005); 151 Cong. Rec. E. 225 et 
seq. (2005) (legislative history).  
54 REAL ID Act Titles I & II.  Other provisions concern border security (§ 102 & Title III) and visas for H2-
B temporary workers, nurses, and Australian nationals (Titles IV & V).   
55 AAMVA National Survey (April 2-4, 2002), available at www.aamva.org. 
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(1) New features of the driver’s license card itself, including 
display of identity information such as the person’s full legal name and a 
digital photo; “common machine readable technology”; and “[p]hysical 
security features designed to prevent tampering, counterfeiting, or 
duplication”;56  
(2) New standards for issuing licenses, requiring DMVs to 
obtain and verify proof of identity, residence, and citizenship or legal 
immigration status; to confirm that license applicants are terminating any 
valid licenses they hold from other states; and to issue licenses that expire 
simultaneously with any temporary immigration status or, in any event, 
after no more than eight years;57 
(3) Verification, storage and sharing of vastly more personal 
information than DMVs have maintained until now, including not only 
databases with motor vehicle and driver records, but also digital images of 
all presented identity documents, such as birth certificates and social 
security cards.58 
The Act penalizes states that do not meet these standards by 
instructing federal agencies not to accept their licenses for “any official 
purpose,”59 such as boarding a plane or entering a federal building. 
Noncompliant states must issue a special license that: “(A) clearly states on 
its face… and (B) uses a unique design or color indicator to alert Federal 
agency and other law enforcement personnel that it may not be accepted.”60 
In light of the many United States citizens who do not have a passport or 
other federally accepted identification, it does not seem like a real option for 
states to refuse to acquiesce to these mandates.61 
However, meeting the standards will not be easy. State officials say 
the REAL ID Act’s requirements are “a nightmare” (Illinois), may require 
“extreme measures and possibly a complete reorganization” (Nebraska), 
                                                 
56 The other required features are: birthdate, gender, license/card number, principal residence address, and  
signature.  REAL ID Act § 202(b).  DMVs must also “ensure the physical security” of card production locations 
and materials and undertake “appropriate security clearance requirements” for production employees.  Id.,§ 
202(d)(7)-(8). 
57 Id. § 202(c)(1)-(3), (d)(6) & (d)(9).  The required proof of identity and residence comprise: “A) A photo 
identity document, except that a non-photo identity document is acceptable if it includes both the person's full 
legal name and date of birth. (B) Documentation showing the person's date of birth. (C) Proof of the person's 
social security account number or verification that the person is not eligible for a social security account number. 
(D) Documentation showing the person's name and address of principle (sic) residence.” Id. § 202(c)(1). DMVs 
must obtain “valid documentary evidence” of a person’s citizenship or legal immigration status in the United 
States and train employees in recognizing fraudulent documents.  Id. § 202(c)(2)-(3) & d(9). 
58 The DMV must keep “digital images of identity source documents… in electronic storage in a transferable 
format” for at least 10 years; and paper copies for at least seven years. Id. § 202(d)(1)-(5). State motor vehicle 
databases must contain all driver’s license and driver record data and must be accessible electronically to all other 
states.  Id. § 202(d)(12)-(13). 
59 These penalties take effect three years after enactment.  Id. § 202 (a)(1).   
60  Id. § 202(d)(11). 
61 A few states are considering opting out nonetheless.  James Mayer, Fight over rules could limit use of 
Oregon ID, THE OREGONIAN, Jan. 15, 2006, at A01; Daniela Gerson, Council to State: Opt Out of Law Barring 
Illegal Immigrants From Driver's Licenses, THE NEW YORK SUN, Dec. 23, 2005, at 3. 
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and are “flat-out impossible” to implement in the time provided 
(Pennsylvania).62  Cost estimates range from $96 million (Pennsylvania) to 
hundreds of millions of dollars in the first few years (Washington and 
Virginia), numbers that make the Congressional Budget Office’s estimate of 
$100 million nationwide look low even for an individual state.63  Even 
seemingly minor requirements such as the mandate that driver’s licenses 
display a person’s full name will require expensive software upgrades to 
enable data fields that can accommodate extremely long names.64  As of 
August 2005, only 8% of states were capable of verifying identity 
documents; only 6% could obtain and store digital, transferable images of 
those documents; and for 82%, implementing such programs will require 
serious financial expenditures, policy changes, and reprogramming.65   
 
2.  Fit 
 
These measures are thus a quintessential example of the problem of fit.  
State DMVs’ driver’s licensing rules and procedures are not at all targeted 
to terrorists or terrorist activities.  Rather, they are rules of general 
applicability that are in fact applied to almost every member of the public, 
and so terrorists represent an extremely small percentage of those affected 
by the REAL ID Act’s reforms. Moreover, because these measures do not 
target terrorists in any particularized way, the chances of effectively 
detecting or deterring them within the vast numbers of people who 
participate in this administrative system are equally small.  At the same 
time, because of the massive scale of DMV operations, the REAL ID Act’s 
reforms represent a great expense and burden, both to the public and to the 
DMVs.   
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how DMVs could  effectively target 
terrorists amongst all those applying for driver’s licenses, for driver’s 
licenses are not necessary for or characteristic of terrorist activities, nor are 
they resources that terrorists use or abuse in a distinctive way that makes 
them a red flag for terrorist activity.  Driver’s licenses are also not the 
exclusive form of identification for any activity.66 As has been frequently 
                                                 
62 Brian Bergstein, National uniform driver’s license law is ‘nightmare, USA TODAY, Jan. 12, 2006, 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2006-01-12-uniform-drivers-license_x.htm; Korey 
Clark, StateNet Capital Journal, January 23, 2006. 
63 Bergstein, supra note __; Clark, supra note __; Editorial, REAL ID Legislation Needs a Reality Check, 
THE ROANOKE TIMES (Va.), Jan. 16, 2006, at B6. 
64 States also note other pragmatic difficulties: current identity documents do not necessarily display a 
person’s full name, nor is it clear in all jurisdictions what constitutes a person’s “legal” name.  American 
Association of Motor Vehicles, “The REAL ID Act: Survey of the States on Implementation of Driver’s License 
and Identification Card Reform” 4 (August 2005), available at www.aamva.org (“AAMVA State Survey”); see 
also Bergstein, supra note __. 
65 AAMVA State Survey, supra note __, at 8 & 10.   
  Nor do even those commentators who support the REAL ID Act’s provisions favor adopting an exclusive 
form of ID. See Paul Rosenzweig & James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., “Federal Standards for State-Issued Identity 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art50
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noted, the 9/11 terrorists could have purchased tickets and boarded planes 
with their passports or some other identification, and it is still perfectly legal 
for any person to get on a plane with non-driver’s license identification.67  
Furthermore, as legal visitors to the United States, the 9/11 terrorists would 
have been eligible for driver’s licenses, albeit temporary ones, under the 
REAL ID Act.68   
In fact, the fit between a driver’s licensing regime and identifying 
foreign terrorists may be even worse than the small number of terrorists in 
the population as a whole would predict.  Foreign terrorists in particular 
seem to be, if anything, less likely than American citizens to need a state 
driver’s license, either to carry on with their everyday lives or to carry out 
their terrorist activities.  Although driver’s licenses are the most readily 
available form of identification for the American public, foreign citizens of 
necessity already possess other forms of federally accepted identification 
when they enter the United States, such as passports.  Foreign citizens may 
well have foreign driver’s licenses as well, permitting them to legally drive, 
at least for short periods, within the United States.   
The REAL ID Act’s focus on bolstering an identity-based security 
system, is a poor fit for actual terrorist behavior in another sense.  All that 
even the best security system that relies on identity as the securitizing 
mechanism can hope to do on its own is to accurately connect names to 
individuals.  But because Al Qaeda and other terrorist networks are known 
to operate through sleeper cells, an individual’s identity, however positively 
confirmed, is a weak test of that individual’s terrorist propensities.69  
Indeed, by focusing attention on the possession of a driver’s license card as 
evidence of government-vetted security, this new regime may be 
counterproductive, reducing the perceived need for other security measures 
and giving first time and previously unidentified terrorists a greater ability 
to act freely due to the perceived security of their driver’s license document.   
Furthermore, the scale of DMV agency action tends to exacerbate 
some of the potentially disabling glitches that lurk in virtually all identity-
based security systems: fraudulent breeder documents, disabling false 
positives, and overwhelming amounts of data. As to the first problem, all 
identity cards, no matter how high tech, are no more reliable than what are 
called “breeder documents”: the supporting documentation that an applicant 
must produce to obtain the card in the first place.70  Here, the only 
                                                                                                                            
Cards: A Reasonable Proposal,” Backgrounder No. 1821 (Feb. 4, 2005) (Heritage Foundation), available at 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/bg1821.cfm. 
67E.g., Zoe Lofgren, A Decade of Radical Change in Immigration Law: An Inside Perspective, 16 STAN. L & 
POL’Y REV. 349, 376 (2005) 
68 Review and Outlook: National ID Party, Wall Street Journal (Feb. 19, 2005), available at 
http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110006316REVIEW & OUTLOOK. 
69Sobel, supra note __ , at 367; Roy, supra note __ at 59. 
70  See generally Bijon Roy, A Case Against Biometric National Identification Systems (NIDS): Trading Off 
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documentation that is common to the entire American population (and thus 
the most rigorous form of documentation that can be demanded by a DMV 
in its driver’s licensing regime) is the birth certificate, which remains as 
trivially easy to forge now as before the REAL ID Act.71 
Similarly, the vast size of the pool of individuals in driver’s license 
databases exacerbates the well-known problem of disabling error rates in 
identity databases.  A somewhat comparable INS database established in the 
1990s proved useless and had to be abandoned due to a 28% error rate, and 
identity databases based on computerized biometric recognition tend to 
yield error rates of between 10-66%.72 Even if the DMVs’ databases were to 
have a 99% accuracy rate, there would be a false positive for one of every 
100 people going through the system – and where the DMVs are concerned, 
there are millions of people in the system. At such rates, DMVs would be 
swamped by the task of checking false positives.73  
Finally, with millions of drivers in each state, and several breeder 
identity documents per driver, the number of documents that DMVs will 
need to process, store, and evaluate will quickly reach into the tens of 
millions.  At this scale, it is likely that the departments will create an 
overload of information for security screening, just as the National Security 
Agency has found itself overwhelmed by the fire hose of data from its 
monitoring of electronic communications.74   
  
3.  Inexpertise 
 
In order to serve what is, in effect, the entire public and to process 
thousands of people per day, DMVs operate at one extreme of trade-offs in 
agency values and characteristics, opting for efficiency over accuracy, and 
for public accountability over agency discretion. Non-discretionary 
standards for qualification are set by state legislatures and departments of 
transportation and applied in rote, assembly line fashion by low level state 
government bureaucrats, on the spot.75  The rules for obtaining a driver’s 
license or registering a car are low baseline, coarse grained rules of limited 
sorting ability: they do not attempt to optimize safety, driving ability, or any 
of the other values they promote, but merely to assure compliance with 
minimum standards.  In addition, DMVs apply minimal scrutiny to public 
                                                                                                                            
Privacy Without Getting Security, 19 WINDSOR REV. SOC. & L. ISSUES 45, 59-61 (2005).  A social security card, 
also required by the REAL ID Act, itself can be obtained with a birth certificate, and the final requirement, proof 
of residence, does not offer any evidence of identity at all and typically requires nothing more than a form lease 
document, which can be obtained for a few dollars from any office supply store.  REAL ID Act §202(c)(1). 
71 See “Legal Presence and DL/ID”, AAMVA stakeholder meeting, available at www.aamva.org. 
72 Richard Sobel, The Demeaning of Identity and Personhood in National Identity Systems, 15 HARV. J. L. & 
TECH. 319, 360 (2002). 
73 Roy, supra note __, at 60-64.   
74 Scott Shane,  The Basics; For the E-Spy, Too Much Information, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Aug. 28, 2005. 
75 E.g., 75 Pa. C.S. § 1501 et. seq. (2005). 
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compliance with these rules, typically accepting proffered documents and 
information at face value, depending on the notion that most of those who 
participate do so voluntarily and in good faith.  
In brief, DMVs have developed a narrow, specialized expertise – 
registration, insurance, and safety of automobiles – and a distinctive 
approach to managing their massive mandate – maintaining a high volume, 
low budget operation.  The results are striking: although DMVs are widely 
derided as inefficient and slow,76 driver licensing is nonetheless, as 
compared to other types of agency functions, a relatively simple, swift 
adjudication process that requires no special training, and whose rules and 
implementation are accessible and understandable to the general public.  
In this light, measures like the REAL ID Act’s requirement that 
DMVs verify applicants’ immigration status take DMVs outside their area 
of expertise and undermine their core purpose. If the purpose of driver’s 
licenses is to assure basic driving ability, understanding of the rules of the 
road, and possession of appropriate insurance, this will force millions of 
illegal immigrants out of the licensing and insurance system.77  If the REAL 
ID Act’s purpose in promoting identity databases is to provide inclusive 
comprehensive records of those in the country, the absence of these millions 
from those records will thwart that purpose as well. 
Such measures not only tend to undermine the agency’s core 
mission of promoting automobile and driver safety and registration, but by 
putting DMV employees to the service of national security measures that 
they are not likely to carry out well, they risk undermining any potential 
effect of those measures as well. The REAL ID Act’s mandated electronic 
databases of scanned breeder documents create fresh opportunities for fraud 
even as they close off others by creating “one stop shopping” in identity 
information and documentation for hackers, thieves – and terrorists.78 These 
new databases could present a new target for terrorism, just as new, 
seemingly secure documents could serve as a Trojan horse for terrorist 
activity with their higher presumption of reliability.  Inexpert DMV 
administration of identity documents and databases is not just self-
                                                 
76 “After spending 3-1/2 hours enduring the long lines, surly clerks and insane regulations at the Department 
of Motor Vehicles, I stopped at a toy store to pick up a gift for my son.  I brought my selection - a Louisville 
slugger baseball bat - to the cash register.  "Cash or charge?" the clerk asked.  "Cash," I snapped. Then 
apologizing for my rudeness, I explained, "I've spent the afternoon at the motor-vehicle bureau."  "Shall I gift 
wrap the bat?" the clerk asked sweetly, "or are you going back to the DMV?"”  “Nothing like the DMV,” at 
http://www.amazinghumor.com/jokes/politicaljokes/nothinglikethedmv.shtml (Jan. 29, 2006).    
77 In advocating for such measures, proponents of stricter penalties for illegal immigrants undervalue the 
benefits of licensing a driver that accrue to the public by safeguarding them from unsafe or uninsured drivers. 
Compare Rosenzweig & Carafano, supra note __, at 5-6 with “Legal Presence” supra note __.   
78 Patrick Peterson, Real ID Act spurs real concerns” FLORIDA TODAY, May 13, 2005, 
http://www.floridatoday.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20050513/NEWS01/505130346/1006; Roy, supra note 
__, at 71; see also James Jay Carafano, et al., “Encrypt E-Passports,” Web Memo #687 (Heritage Foundation 
publication Mar. 15, 2005) (conservative critique of inadequately safeguarded document technology), available at 
www. Heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/wm687.cfm.   
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defeating, but dangerous.79  
 
4. Overdiscretion 
 
Fundamental principles of administrative law would suggest that 
assignment of new authority, (and especially authority outside an agency’s 
expertise) should be accompanied by increased external oversight of that 
authority.  And yet at the same time that the REAL ID Act grants new 
spheres of authority to DMV employees, it offers no direction to these 
agencies as to the procedures they should follow, nor does it make any 
provisions for oversight or review.  The REAL ID Act thus expands DMV 
discretion at the same time that it requires the agency to undertake tasks at 
which it is inexpert, and ultimately, places access to an essential public 
benefit at the mercy of street level DMV employees.   
We might hope that the DMVs will not follow the patterns of other 
agencies like the Treasury Department80 that have delegated their new 
responsibilities to low level bureaucrats with singular decision making 
authority.  But given the volume of applications to be processed, and in 
light of the lack of any mandate of oversight or review in the Act, it is 
difficult to imagine that DMVs will act otherwise. Past actions of the New 
York DMV in exercising similar discretion offer a cautionary tale.  When 
the New York DMV attempted to confirm the social security numbers of its 
licensees a few years ago – a step now required by the REAL ID Act but 
not required by federal law at that time – it found 600,000 incorrect or 
duplicate numbers.  Its response was to send letters threatening to 
summarily suspend those licenses if valid social security numbers were not 
provided within 15 days, a move that, if implemented, would have 
summarily put hundreds of thousands of people in violation of drivers and 
insurance regulations without the slightest inquiry into the cause of these 
discrepencies, as well as throwing the driver’s licensing system into chaos.  
A lawsuit was successful in preventing this action primarily because the 
judge found that the DMV was acting outside its discretion.81    Now under 
the REAL ID, the New York DMV has this authority, but it is unlikely it 
has developed the capacity to exercise prudently the unfettered, inexpert 
discretion it has acquired. 
  
5.  The Effect on Proxies 
                                                 
79 For a conservative analysis of measures necessary to protect data, see Paul Rosenzweig and Alane 
Kochems, “Data Protection: Safeguarding Privacy in a New Age of Technology,” Legal Memorandum No. 16 
(Heritage Foundation Mar. 23, 2005), available at www.heritage.org.   
80 See discussion infra part III. 
81 See Cubas v. Martinez, Decision and Order of May 9, 2005, Index No. 113271/04, N.Y. Supr. Ct., at 
http://www.nycourts.gov/press/dmvFinal.pdf. 
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What is most striking about the REAL ID Act’s new DMV 
mandates is that none of them have anything directly to do either with 
terrorist activities or with singling out and targeting behaviors that are red 
flags for terrorism -- nor are they intended to do so.  If the mandates can be 
effectively implemented by our inexpert, unsupervised DMVs, what the 
REAL ID Act’s measures will do is make it more difficult– not impossible, 
but more difficult – for an individual to obtain a driver’s license reflecting a 
false name or other inaccurate information, to produce a persuasive 
duplicate of a state license, or to obtain a license without having legal status 
in the country.  These regulations cannot touch, even if they are applied 
with absolute accuracy, those domestic and foreign terrorists who are not on 
watch lists and obtain IDs in their own names, who have the means to 
obtain false breeder documents or fake driver’s licenses, or who do not 
require driver’s licenses to carry out their terrorist activities.   
As such, these measures target proxy groups: those who are unable 
to provide or unwilling to falsify the supporting documentation necessary to 
obtain the licenses. Advocates of the REAL ID Act’s measures argue that 
this will have some indirect effects on terrorists that is itself enough to 
justify these sweeping reforms.82  But the groups that the REAL ID Act’s 
provisions are in fact most likely to capture are exactly the proxy groups 
they target, in this case, primarily illegal immigrants.  While we may wish 
to limit illegal immigration, such measures should be justified on their own 
merits, according to the costs and benefits involved in targeting illegal 
immigration, not by putting the false weight of a national security finger on 
the scales of the cost-benefit analysis.83   
Those who will be swept in by these regulations also include other 
vulnerable populations unable to meet one or more of the new requirements: 
“poor, elderly or disabled residents unable to produce the necessary 
documents,”84 legal immigrants whose documents are difficult to verify, 
and devout members of faiths whose tenets forbid them to display their 
faces for photo identification.85 Other members of the public will likely be 
caught up as well, whether through the DMV’s inexpert, unsupervised 
administration or simply through the ordinary error rates in identity 
databases.  The effect on these proxy groups and others is potentially dire: 
                                                 
82 Rosenzweig & Carafano, supra note __, at 1-2. 
83 Conservative commentators agree that the immigration issue “really is separate from the national interest 
in more reliable and secure forms of identification” and “if regulating immigration and incentives affecting illegal 
immigration is the real purpose of congressional legislation, it ought to be addressed in separate legislation.”  Id. 
at 6. 
84 REAL ID Legislation needs a reality check,  supra note __.  
85 “Religious Accommodation in Driver’s License Photographs: A review of codes, policies and practices in 
the 50 states,” Council on American-Islamic Relations Research Center (2004), available at www.cair-
net.org/downloads/driversphoto.pdf.  
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in addition to the loss of federally acceptable ID, denial of the driving 
privilege may amount in some areas to loss of the opportunity to work, 
attend school, and otherwise lead a responsible, self-sustaining existence.86 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
All in all, the DMV’s driver’s licensing system is an astonishingly 
poor fit for detecting and deterring terrorist activities.  As a regime that 
affects the entire public, its reform imposes enormous financial costs on 
agencies intended to serve an entirely different purpose.  As a system 
applicable to the public at large, it does not successfully target hallmarks of 
terrorist activity, and as a system involving such a vast number of people, it 
cannot by virtue of its sheer scope and size function effectively at 
identifying and isolating individuals who present security threats.  The 
REAL ID Act’s security imperatives push an agency from its classic 
bureaucratic task of rationalizing a narrow set of expert tasks to purposes 
and procedures in which it has no special expertise, and require 
discretionary decision-making from low-level bureaucrats accustomed to 
rote application of simple rules with no particular provision for oversight.  It 
is a fundamental mismatch between discretion and oversight, and between 
task and expertise. 
 
B.   USCIS and Political Asylum 
By tradition and conviction, our country is a welcoming society. 
America is a stronger and better nation because of the hard work and the 
faith and the entrepreneurial spirit of immigrants.  Every generation of 
immigrants has reaffirmed the wisdom of remaining open to the talents and 
dreams of the world.87 
Political asylum is meant to provide a safe haven for refugees and a 
bulwark against genocide, crimes against humanity, torture, and other 
violations of human rights. In order to obtain asylum in the United States, 
an applicant must have experienced “persecution or [have] a well-founded 
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in 
a particular social group, or political opinion” in her home country (or, if 
the applicant is stateless, in her country of long-term residence).88   
In addition to its humanitarian purpose, political asylum has also 
long served foreign policy and national security goals.  Indeed, until 1980, 
asylum admissions were openly tied to foreign policy, as eligibility to apply 
                                                 
86 Raquel Aldana & Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, ”Aliens" in Our Midst Post-9/11, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1683, 
1717-18 (2005). 
87 President George W. Bush, Speech of Jan. 7, 2004, transcript available at 
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=36498.  
88 Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101(a)(42)(A) (“INA”). 
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for asylum was determined by ad hoc legislation authorizing admissions 
from communist states and other Cold War enemies.89  Today, admission of 
asylees still presents an opportunity to cultivate an image of the United 
States as a “beacon for freedom” 90 and to vilify the nations that refugees 
have fled.91 
 
1. The New Regulatory Scheme 
 
While the U.S. government has treated asylum as a means to secure 
its foreign policy goals through strategic asylum admissions, it has also 
feared that asylum introduces risk in the form of the admission of aliens 
from what are often, by virtue of the purpose and definition of asylum itself, 
hostile or even enemy states.92  The REAL ID Act is a legislative 
expression of this fear, and it is not the first. In 1996, after the 1993 World 
Trade Center bombing and the murders of several CIA agents by foreign 
nationals, as well as the unrelated but nonetheless galvanizing Oklahoma 
City bombing (which was carried out by American citizens), Congress 
enacted the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which, among 
other measures, eliminated judicial review of certain deportation orders, and 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(“IIRIRA”), which provided for mandatory detention of many asylum 
seekers, “expedited removal” of asylum seekers at the border, and imposed 
other limits on asylum applications.93  The REAL ID Act also builds upon 
the post-9/11 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 (“IRTPA”), which introduced broader 
definitions of terrorism and terrorist associations for purposes of deportation 
and inadmissibility.94   
In Title I of the REAL ID Act, “Amendments to Protect against 
Terrorist Entry,” Congress amended numerous sections of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (“INA”), introducing certain crucial changes affecting 
                                                 
89 Michael McBride, Migrants and Asylum-Seekers, 37 INT’L MIGRATION 289, 292-94 (1999); Ruth Ellen 
Wasem, “U.S. Immigration Policy on Asylum Seekers” 2 (CRS Report for Congress Feb. 16, 2005). 
90 President George W. Bush, Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation, (Sep. 11, 2001), 
available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html.  
91  In 2003, the top three countries for approved asylum claims were Colombia, China and Haiti, in contrast 
to the U.S.S.R., Vietnam, and Cuba during the Cold War. . U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of 
Immigration Statistics, FY2003 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, at 47. 
92 Bill Ong Hing, Defining America Through Immigration Policy 233-35 (2004). 
93 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L.No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (“AEDPA”); 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 
(“IIRIRA”); David Martin, “The 1995 Asylum Reforms: A Historic and Global Perspective,” Backgrounder, 
Center for Immigration Studies, at 3 (May 2000). 
94 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (“USA PATRIOT Act”).  In 
debate over the IRTPA, Congress considered but did not enact many of the measures that eventually were 
included the REAL ID Act.  Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458 (S. 
2845), Title V (“IRTPA”)  
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how the USCIS processes asylum claims: 
(1) The Act makes the legal standard for attaining refugee status 
more demanding for all asylum applicants, requiring asylum applicants to 
establish that “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion… was or will be at least one central reason for 
persecuting the applicant;”95 
(2) It vests greater discretion in the administrative adjudicator in 
assessing the applicant’s credibility and requiring corroborating evidence 
even of “persuasive” testimony;96 and 
(3) It limits judicial review of the adjudicator’s expanded exercise of 
discretion by preserving judicial review only for constitutional and legal 
claims (as required by a 2001 Supreme Court decision) and not for 
discretionary or factual findings.97  
 
2.  Fit 
 
Like the REAL ID Act’s driver’s licensing provisions, its asylum 
provisions do not attempt to hone the asylum adjudication system’s ability 
to distinguish terrorist from non-terrorist applicants.98  Instead, they change 
the baseline rules for a large population that is voluntarily providing 
information to the government in exchange for the benefit of political 
asylum. Like driver’s licensing, political asylum is neither necessary to 
terrorist activity, nor is it something that terrorists use in distinctive ways 
that are a red flag for terrorism.  And as with driver’s licensing, the only 
way of searching for terrorists in the pool of asylum applicants is to 
examine each application, one by one.  It is a large pool:  while the political 
asylum process does not implicate virtually every person in the United 
States as does driver’s licensings, in 2003, the agency received applications 
                                                 
95 REAL ID Act § 101(a)(3) (emphasis added); compare with Matter of T-M-B, 21 I.& N. Dec. 775, 777 
(BIA 1997) (applicants must “produce evidence from which it is reasonable to believe that the harm was 
motivated, at least in part, by an actual or imputed protected ground”); Matter of Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658 
(BIA 1998) (same).  
96 REAL ID Act § 101(a)(3). 
97.The act also specifically bars courts from reversing requirements of corroborative evidence unless “a 
reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude that such corroborating evidence is unavailable.” REAL ID Ac, 
§101(e).  In addition, it vests discretion over asylum decisions in the Director of Homeland Security in addition to 
the Attorney General; eliminates a planned study on vulnerabilities in the asylum system; and, in a pair of changes 
benefiting asylum applicants, lifts the caps on applicants whose claims are based on coercive population controls 
and on the number of asylees permitted to change status to permanent residents each year.  Id. §101(b)-(d) & (f)-
(h).   
98 It is worth noting that in its non-asylum related immigration provisions, the Act also expands the 
prohibited connections to terrorism that bar all immigrants from admissibility.  Of particular note is its new 
definitions of “material support” for a “terrorist organization,” which diverge from the criminal definitions of 
crucial terms and are of troubling breadth. REAL ID Act, § 103(b)-(c); compare to 18 USC §§ 2339a-2339b (as 
amended by the USA PATRIOT Act); see also ACLU Testimony on Material Support for Terrorism Laws: 
Section 805 of the Patriot Act and Section 6603 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
Before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security (5/10/2005), available at  
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/17536leg20050510.html. 
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for 61,660 applicants and family members, and during the period from 
1996-2002 there was an average of 64,697 applications per year.99  
Moreover, the fit between this pool and terrorists is a weak one.  As 
the 9/11 commission staff has noted, “very few people” amongst the 
millions of annual immigrants to the United States pose any threat to 
national security.100  Asylum applicants are no exception to this rule.  Out of 
the roughly one million people who have applied for asylum since 1989, a 
2005 study could identify only sixteen people with any nexus whatsoever to 
terrorism, a rate of approximately 1/1000 of one percent.101  
Remarkably, this low, two-digit number may overstate the number 
of terrorists currently in the asylum system, because virtually every incident 
of convicted terrorists entering via the asylum system dates to the early 
1990s, before mandatory FBI security checks and detention of virtually all 
entering asylum seekers made asylum an unappealing avenue into the 
United States.102 Asylum is a voluntary system, and one that terrorists can 
and do opt out of.  Indeed, the available evidence concerning asylum 
seekers’ propensity to engage in terrorist activity is anecdotal, not 
systematic:  there is no data on the number of immigrants who engage in or 
support terrorist activity, much less on the number of asylum seekers who 
do so, nor any data comparing terrorist propensities among immigrants as 
opposed to citizens.103  
Furthermore, if the fit between asylum seekers and terrorists is poor, the 
fit between the changes introduced by the REAL ID Act and terrorist 
behavior is worse.  As in other agencies that depend on information 
volunteered by participants in exchange for a benefit, reforms to the general 
reporting standards applicable to all participants burden genuine, good faith 
participants as a matter of course, but tend to be easy for terrorists and other 
bad faith actors to evade by providing false information. Genuine asylum 
applicants often do not have corroborating evidence for their claim, having 
fled their countries without stopping to gather supporting documentation.104  
                                                 
99 The number of applications has fluctuated substantially with peak levels in the hundreds of thousands of 
applications per year in the mid-1990s.  2003 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics at 45-46 & 56, available at 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/Asylees.htm.  
100 9/11 Commission report at 383.  Some of these immigrants come for brief visits, while others stay for 
longer periods. 
101 Not only this, this number includes some who had not even been so much as accused, much less 
convicted, of terrorist activities themselves, but who are “friends” or “associates” of known terrorists, as well as 
those who filed asylum claims as a last ditch measure while in the process of being deported.  Janice L. Kephart, 
“Moving Beyond the 9/11 Staff Report on Terrorist Travel “ at 26-28, Center for Immigration Studies, Center 
Paper 24 (Sept. 2005).  It is particularly striking that these numbers were produced by an author in support of the 
REAL ID Act’s measures. 
102 Lofgren, supra note __, at 355-56, 366-37, & 375; Wasem, supra note __, at 10. 
103 E.g., Philip Martin and Susan Martin, Managing Migration to Prevent Terrorism, 29 MIGRATION WORLD 
19 (2001); Carl F. Horowitz, “An Examination of U.S. Immigration Policy and Serious Crime,” Center for 
Immigration Studies (April 2001). 
104 David Martin, supra note __. 
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Nor can asylum applicants always demonstrate the motive of their 
persecutors and how “central” that motive is to their persecution.105 As 
Representative Langevin argued, with some rhetorical hyperbole, in protest 
of the REAL ID Act’s restrictions, “Can we imagine sending a refugee back 
to face genocide in Sudan because he or she does not have a letter from the 
government explaining that religion was the reason his or her family was 
murdered?”106  But by obtaining false documentation and providing false 
testimony, terrorists can readily appear to meet these standards.  These 
measures thus present the quintessential problem of using civil rules to try 
to reach non-civil actors: those actors either opt out or simply refuse to play 
by the rules. 
 
3.  Inexpertise and Overdiscretion 
 
The REAL ID Act’s asylum measures take an agency that is 
excoriated for its incompetence and abuse of discretion and grant it greater 
authority and discretion in the name of national security.  In theory, the 
USCIS ought to have the expertise to accurately adjudicate asylum claims 
and exercise discretion judiciously, but when we look below the surface of 
the agency’s assigned capability and authority to assess how the agency 
actually exercises that capability and authority, the reality is quite different. 
In fact, judicial review has long revealed our immigration agency to 
be a disorganized and beleaguered organization, notorious for backlogs and 
arbitrary and legally erroneous decisions.107 While efforts to improve 
performance at the asylum officer level have reportedly born some fruit, not 
so at the level of immigration judges, the determinative finders of fact in 
any claims not immediately granted upon initial review.  Federal judges 
reviewing asylum decisions have repeatedly found, in the words of Judge 
Posner, that "the adjudication of these cases at the administrative level has 
fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice."108   In December 2005 
and January 2006 alone, judges reviewing asylum decisions in the Third 
and Seventh Circuits castigated the involved Immigration Judges and the 
Board of Immigration Appeals that carries out administrative reviews for a 
pattern of arbitrary, unlawful, and biased rulings:   
At the risk of sounding like a broken record, we reiterate our oft-
                                                 
105 Id. 
106 Rep. James R. Langevin of Rhode Island, 151 Cong. Rec. E. 247 (Feb. 10, 2005).  
107 Congress has repeatedly passed laws divesting the courts of appellate and habeas jurisdiction over 
immigration decisions; the REAL ID Act codifies a recent Supreme Court decision asserting that review of 
constitutional and legal claims must be available, while expressly stripping the courts of jurisdiction over any 
discretionary or fact-based claims.  INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001); REAL ID Act § 106(a).  For an analysis 
of the judicial review provisions of the REAL ID Act, see Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law and Federal 
Court Jurisdiction through the Lens of Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 101 (2005). 
108 Adam Liptak, Federal Courts Criticize Judges’ Handling of Asylum Cases, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Dec. 
26, 2005. 
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expressed concern with the adjudication of asylum claims by the 
Immigration Court and the Board of Immigration Appeals…. The 
performance of these federal agencies is too often inadequate.109   
The REAL ID Act measures rely on raising the legal standards for 
asylum and increasing agency discretion in holding applicants to those 
standards.  But USCIS’s inadequacy in adjudicating claims suggests such an 
approach is likely to be counterproductive. As Patricia Freshwater has 
noted, “terrorists are already barred from any grant of asylum if their claims 
are accurately adjudicated. For this reason, the United States should have a 
security interest in providing the most accurate adjudication of asylum 
claims possible.”110  The REAL ID Act’s focus on standards, corroborating 
evidence, and applicant credibility are red herrings:  the weak link here is 
not the standards that the agency is asked to apply, but agency 
incompetence and abuse of discretion in applying them.  
But remarkably, the REAL ID Act actually undermines the 
development of agency expertise, rather than bolstering it. Among its other 
measures, the REAL ID Act scuttled a study called for by the IRTPA in 
2004 that was to have investigated how many asylum applicants have been 
in some way connected to terrorist activities and the effects of the relevant 
legal standards on those cases, if any.  This is data that the agency might 
have used to develop real expertise in sussing out terrorists, or to conclude 
that the asylum system is not the place to be looking for them after all.111  
Instead, the REAL ID Act simply presumed that these linkages exist and 
cancelled the study,112 
Furthermore, the REAL ID Act duplicates expert, directed 
investigation with USCIS’s inexpert, indirect evaluation process, for there is 
already an agency tasked with expert evaluation of security issues 
performing checks on asylum seekers: the FBI.  Fingerprinting and an FBI 
security check are the first steps in evaluation of an asylum claim, as well as 
“multiple background checks in the terrorist, immigration, and law 
enforcement databases, notably the Interagency Border Inspection System 
(IBIS),” which links to seven other FBI, former INS, and State Department 
databases,113 and an “expanded screening list”114 against which foreign 
nationals can be checked.  Layering inexpert USCIS evaluation that is not 
                                                 
109Pasha v. Gonzales, No. 04-4166 (7th Cir. Dec. 29, 2005); Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, at 17 (3rd Cir. Jan. 19, 
2006) (on file with author). 
110 Patricia Freshwater, The Obligation of Non-Refoulement under the Convention against Torture, 19 
GEORGETOWN IMMIG. L.J. 585, 592 (2005). 
111 IRPTA § 5403(a)-(b). 
112 REAL ID Act § 101(i); see also Statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee of Texas (Feb. 9, 2005), 151 Cong. Rec. 
H. 453 (2005). 
113 Wasem, supra note __, at 10. 
114 George W. Bush, Speech of Jan. 7, 2004, transcript available at 
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=36498. 
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specifically directed at terrorist activity to expert FBI investigation of 
terrorist connections does not add value to the process.115   
Similarly, core concepts of administrative law suggest that when 
agencies consistently carry out their tasks incompetently, and especially 
when internal agency oversight mechanisms prove ineffective, the balance 
between agency discretion and external oversight should shift toward 
greater oversight.116  Here, it seems obvious that, as a matter of agency 
capability, these administrative adjudicators need more supervision, not 
less. But instead, the REAL ID Act increases agency discretion and limits 
judicial oversight of the very fact-based determinations that are at the heart 
of asylum claims.117  
 
4.  Impact on Proxies 
 
The REAL ID Act’s provisions on political asylum target a 
particularly vulnerable group as proxies for terrorists: those who have been 
driven from their homes by violence and suffering and are at the mercy of 
another state to take them in. As Immigration Judge Denise Slavin, the 
current president of the National Association of Immigration Judges, has 
explained, asylum adjudications involve high stakes, “life-or-death 
decisions in terms of whether you're going to send someone back to a place 
where they may be killed."118  Counterbalanced against the risks of granting 
fraudulent and particularly terrorist claims, therefore, is the grave risk of 
harm posed by the denial of genuine claims for applicants deported to face a 
threat of renewed persecution in their home countries.119  
In passing the REAL ID Act, Congress targeted another kind of 
proxy: the political asylum process itself. These reforms take sides in a 
longstanding, ongoing debate over the proper legal and evidentiary 
standards in the political asylum process.  Critics assert that the pre-REAL 
ID Act tests and evidentiary standards are too low to permit adjudicators to 
                                                 
115  Identified terrorists are already barred by statute from receiving asylum irrespective of the validity of 
their claims of persecution, as are those who are members of terrorist organizations, deemed terrorist risks, have 
advocated terrorist activity, or have given material support to a terrorist organization INA §§ 212(a)(3)(B) & 
237(a)(4)(B).   
116 See discussion supra part A. 
117 This is particularly calamitous, as it follows upon a 2002 change in agency policy that curtailed the 
administrative process of review for asylum decisions, adopting new rules that, among other things, permit a 
single BIA member to issue a summary dismissal of an administrative appeal without any written opinion. 
Previously, panels of three board members would hear appeals and issue written decisions in each case.  The 
changes are an effort to remedy a backlog of over 56,000 cases.  Federal judges reviewing these cases on appeal 
have offered vitriolic criticism of this change, stating that the current process constitutes no review at all. John 
R.B. Palmer, et al., Why are So Many People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals in Federal Court?  An 
Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, Cornell Law School Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series, at 5 & 25 (Sep. 21 2005) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=785824. 
118 Liptak, supra note __. 
119 David Martin, supra note __, at 3. 
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effectively cull out fraudulent and terrorist applicants,120 while others 
contend that the same tests and standards are so demanding as to obstruct 
recognition of legitimate claims.121  Both point to the limited capacity of the 
adjudicative process to assess cases that are centered on the types of legal 
questions and subject to the limited evidence presented by asylum 
applicants.  But if these critiques are correct, they should raise similar 
questions about the potential capacity of this system to distinguish terrorist 
from non-terrorist applicants, and about the effectiveness of the REAL ID 
Act reforms, no matter what standards are applied.  Furthermore, the lack of 
any apparent connection between the REAL ID Act’s new standards and 
terrorism per se, together with the connection to this longstanding debate in 
asylum law, suggest that, far from aiming for terrorists and hitting a proxy 
group, Congress may in fact be hitting exactly the target it had in its sights. 
Beyond the effect on the proxy group and on political asylum, the 
focus on foreigners as a proxy for terrorists is dangerous for national 
security as well.  The assumption that terrorists are necessarily foreigners 
has already been put to the lie in Britain, where the suspects in the July 
2005 bombing attacks on London public transportation were “British, born 
and bred.”122 In the U.S., while the 9/11 attacks were particularly 
spectacular and deadly, “the number of domestic terrorist acts in the past 
five years far outweighs the number of international acts.”123 Pointing to 
domestic terrorists like William Krar, “an East Texas man who stockpiled 
enough sodium cyanide to gas everyone in a building the size of a high 
school basketball gymnasium before he was arrested in 2002,”124 one 
terrorism expert warned that “[t]he government has a severe case of tunnel 
vision when it comes to domestic terrorism.”125  While we should not turn a 
blind eye to the risks of foreign terrorism, focusing our national security 
measures almost exclusively on foreign risks is to mistake the proxy for the 
                                                 
120 Mark Krikorian, “Who Deserves Asylum?,” 101 Commentary 52 (June 1996). 
121Considering case studies of asylum seekers fleeing the Salvadoran and Guatemalan civil wars, Susan 
Bibler Coutin concluded that “continual violence, surveillance and interrogation made the causes of persecution 
unclear and defined average people as potentially subversive,” creating a “gap between legal definitions of 
persecution and the repressive tactics that are directed at suspect populations.” Susan Bibler Coutin, The 
Oppressed, the Suspect and the Citizen: Subjectivity in Competing Accounts of Political Violence, LAW AND 
SOCIAL INQUIRY 60, 65 (2001). 
122 Matthew Chance, Britain’s home-grown terrorists, CNN, July 14, 2005, 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/07/14/homegrown.terror/.   
123 Kris Axtman, The Terror Threat at Home, Often Overlooked, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 
29, 2003, www.Csmonitor.com/2003/1229/p02s01-usju.html (quoting Mark Pitcavage of the fact-finding 
department at the Anti-Defamation League). 
124 Larry Copeland, Domestic Terrorism: New Trouble at Home, USA TODAY (Nov. 14, 2004), available 
at www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-11-14-domestic-terrorism_x.htm; see also Terry Frieden, FBI, ATF 
address domestic terrorism, www.cnn.com/2005/US/05/19/domestic.terrorism; “FBI Whistleblower: White 
Supremacists are Major Domestic Terror Threat,” Interview of Mike German (June 13, 2005), available at 
www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=05/06/13/145217.    
125 Axtman, supra note 123 (quoting Daniel Levitas, author of “The Terrorist Next Door: The Militia 
Movement and the Radical Right”).    
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terrorist. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
Targeting immigrants as proxies for terrorists may make us all feel 
safer, but these measures are unlikely to make us safer in fact, especially in 
the inexpert, unsupervised hands of the USCIS.  Rather than focusing on 
improving the security measures that are already in place, taking measures 
to improve the expertise and capability of asylum adjudicators, or at least 
increasing oversight of their alarmingly arbitrary practices, the REAL ID 
Act’s reforms seem guaranteed to introduce more risk into the system. 
 
III. THE PATRIOT ACT AND THE FINANCIAL WAR AGAINST TERROR 
 
A. OFAC And The Evolution Of The Asset Freeze 
 
Many commentators have worried about the civil liberties problems 
created by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control.126  
Because the agency is freezing the assets of organizations it suspects of 
cooperation with terrorists through a civil administrative process that 
involves none of the usual checks of the Fourth Amendment, their fears are 
not unwarranted.127  But we think there are even more fundamental 
problems with OFAC’s war on terror.  The use of financial regulation to 
take and, in some cases, operate the property of American charities and 
individuals in the name of that war has been inexpert and unchannelled, as 
well as incongruous.128   
In the following section, we describe the regulatory regime 
administered by OFAC.  That regime is designed to prevent terrorists from 
using property – originally assets kept in regulated financial institutions, 
                                                 
126 See, e.g., Nicole Nice-Petersen, Note, Justice For The "Designated": The Process That Is Due To Alleged 
U.S. Financiers Of Terrorism  93 GEO. L.J. 1387, 1388 (2005) (“The current procedures provided to U.S. entities 
under IEEPA fall far short of meeting basic due process requirements.”); Laila Al-Marayati, American Muslim 
Charities: Easy Targets In The War On Terror, 25 PACE L. REV. 321, 321 (2005) (symposium issue) (“seriously 
affect the rights of Americans both to engage in charitable giving and to know that their government's efforts 
directly result in the increased safety and security of the American people”). 
127 As the 9/11 commission staff has observed, “the use of administrative orders with few due process 
protections, particularly against our own citizens, raises significant civil liberty concerns and risks a substantial 
backlash.” NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING 50 
(2004), available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_ Monograph.pdf [hereinafter 
“9/11 COMMISSION MONOGRAPH”]. 
128 OFAC did do some terrorism regulation before 9/11.  AEDPA, passed in the mid-90s, authorizes the 
Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, to designate an 
organization as a Foreign Terrorist Organization ("FTO"). See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a). Designation as a FTO has 
singificant consequences to an organization, its members, and its supporters, not least because of what OFAC is 
then authorized to do – namely, freeze all assets of a FTO in or controlled by a United States financial institution. 
See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(C). Additionally, representatives and certain members of FTOs may be barred from 
entry into the United States, see id. § 1182(a)(3)(B), and may play a role if FTO's supporters find themselves 
facing criminal prosecution. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). 
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now any form of property – within the reach of Department of Treasury 
regulators.129  It is a scheme that has turned regulators who tracked the 
assets of foreign countries with whom we were at war to regulators who 
grab the assets of individuals – often individual American citizens – who 
might wish us ill.  In this section, we consider some of the administrative 
problems that the new regulatory scheme has created. 
 
1. The New Regulatory Scheme 
 
Twelve days after 9/11, the President issued an executive order 
declaring a national emergency and authorizing the Secretary of the 
Treasury to freeze the assets of groups or individuals that, among other 
things, that "assist in, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or 
technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of, 
such acts of terrorism.”130  The president acted, he announced, “because of 
the pervasiveness and expansiveness of the financial foundation of foreign 
terrorists.”131  The authority for these freezes came from the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).132   
Many of the powers granted to OFAC under IEEPA pre-dated 9/11, 
although 9/11 prompted the agency to reinterpret these powers. Pursuant to 
the pre-9/11 IEEPA, the President was granted the authority "to deal with 
any unusual and extraordinary threat ... to the national security, foreign 
policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national 
emergency with respect to such threat.”133  IEEPA gave the president the 
ability to “freeze” the assets of nations with whom the United States is 
either at war or had designated to be a national enemy.  The statute also 
provided for the sanctioning of supporters and nationals of the enemy.134   
The Patriot Act added to these powers the ability to “block” assets 
during the pendency of civil investigations into whether particular 
                                                 
129 In addition to serving as a financial regulator, OFAC also issues export licenses and regulates some other 
aspects of the interaction between Americans and foreign nations with whom we are at or close to war. 
130 Exec. Order No. 13,224 § 1(d)(i).  For more background, see John B. Reynolds, III, et al., Export 
Controls And Economic Sanctions, 37 INT'L LAW. 263, 265 (2003). 
131 Exec. Order No. 13,224.  As one federal banking official explained to Congress, OFAC is acting “under 
presidential wartime and national emergency powers and authority granted by specific legislation to impose 
controls on transactions and freeze foreign assets under U.S. jurisdiction.”  Testimony of Herbert A. Biern, Senior 
Associate Director, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation, on The Bank Secrecy Act and the USA 
Patriot Act,  before the Comm. on Int’l Rel., U.S. House of Rep., November 17, 2004, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/2004/20041117/default.htm 
132 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706. 
133 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a).   
134 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(C).  For a discussion, see Hon. Frederic Block, Civil Liberties During National 
Emergencies: The Interactions Between The Three Branches Of Government In Coping With Past And Current 
Threats To The Nation's Security, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 459, 524 (2005); Angela D. Hardister, Can 
We Buy Peace on Earth?: The Price of Freezing Terrorist Assets in a Post-September 11 World, 28 N.C.J. INT’L 
L. & COM. REG. 605 (Spring 2003). 
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individuals, entities, or organizations were engaged in these activities.135  It 
also permitted designations to be justified and defended in court with 
classified, ex-parte evidence.136 
After 9/11, the president announced the creation of a class of 
Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) – a bureaucratic move that 
he declared was “a major thrust of our war on terrorism” and a “strike on 
the financial foundation of the global terror network.”137  Executive Order 
No. 13,224 defined the term to include foreign terrorists, and anyone who 
“assists in, sponsors, or provides financial, material, or technological 
support for, or services in support of” terrorism; and also “agents” or 
persons “associated” with these terrorists.138  
But while the reach of the SDGT regulations are broad, making a 
case for an asset freeze is not correspondingly deep.139  The initial freeze of 
assets and property is “contingent on the signing of a piece of paper,” as the 
9/11 commission staff put it – a blocking order pending investigation – by 
the director of OFAC, a mid-level government official, without any further 
administrative process or review.140  No warrant is required for the 
                                                 
135 Specifically, the Patriot Act amended the freezing and blocking powers of OFAC to permit it to 
investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or 
prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or 
exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, 
any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to 
any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.   
§ 1702(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added).   
136 See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(c). 
137 The president’s remarks may be found at http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/24/ret.bush.transcript/.  
Although SDGTs are the most common designation adopted by the government against terrorists ,it is not the only 
one.  Exec. Order No. 13,224 also created a category of “specially designated terrorists” or SDTs, and before 9/11, 
before the days when OFAC was freezing the assets of suspected individual terrorists, it developed a category of 
“foreign terrorist organizations” (FTOs) in the 1990s, many of whom it is now recharacterizing as SDGTs.  The 
most recent version of the list is available on OFAC’s website.  Office of Foreign Assets Control, Specially 
Designated Nationals, http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/index.shtml.  The Patriot Act and new 
Executive Order added a new structure to an already extant counter-terrorism financing regime.  In 1995, 
President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,947, pursuant to the IEEPA, Exec. Order No. 12,947, which 
designated certain terrorist organizations, as "Specially Designated Terrorists," and blocked all of their property 
and interests in property. The order also allowed for additional designations if an organization or person is found 
to be "owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of" a specially designated terrorist.  See id.  The State 
Department handled FTO designations, though all have since been designated as SDGTs as well. 
138 Exec. Order No. 13,224 § 1.  For more, see Nina J. Crimm, High Alert: The Government's War On The 
Financing Of Terrorism And Its Implications For Donors, Domestic Charitable Organizations, And Global 
Philanthropy, 45 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1341 1370-73 (2004); see also Nina J. Crimm, Post-September 11 
Fortified Anti-Terrorism Measures Compel Heightened Due Diligence, 25 PACE L. REV. 203 (2005) (symposium 
piece reviewing developments in the financial regulation of terrorism, with particular attention to the compliance 
required by regulated industry). 
139 As Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar has noted, “Even when executive branch officials discuss asset freezes, 
they describe the basis for an asset freeze as merely a "belief" (which is consistent with the broad discretion 
provided by the statute).” Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Mismatch Between State Power And State Capacity In 
Transnational Law Enforcement, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 15, 58 n.90 (2004). 
140 9/11 COMMISSION MONOGRAPH at 112 (“This provision lets the government shut down an organization 
without any formal determination of wrongdoing. It requires a single piece of paper, signed by a midlevel 
government official.”)  To be sure, OFAC officials describe the designation process has subject to some degree of 
internal review: As the agency’s director testified to Congress, “A completed OFAC evidentiary record on a 
particular target is submitted first for legal review, then to the Executive Office of Terrorist Finance and Financial 
Crimes, where OFAC officers work with that office to prepare the package for the Policy Coordinating 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art50
32    Baylis & Zaring               2006 
 
procedure, which, pursuant to the Patriot Act, is often initiated at the outset, 
rather than the culmination, of an investigation into whether SDGT targets 
are, in fact, associated with terrorism.   
The remedy for those whose assets have been blocked during the 
pendency of an investigation lies in administrative or judicial review of the 
designation order.141  But the preliminary nature of the government action, 
the arbitrary and capricious standard of review of agency “freezures,” as 
we’ll call them,142 with an overlay of deference in national security matters, 
and the ability of the agency to keep much of the record for review 
classified – makes review likely to fail.143  We are aware of no cases where 
plaintiffs have successfully challenged a designation and OFAC blocking 
order since the advent of the war on terror.144  Reviews of OFAC’s post-
investigation actions have a more checkered history in the courts – it is then 
that SDGTs can bring claims challenging the legality and sufficiency of the 
designation – but there, too, OFAC enjoys the benefits of deferential APA 
review.145 
 Since 9/11, OFAC has issued a regular series of lists of SDGTs and 
their alleged supporters.146  As of 2004, the agency had designated 375 
individuals or entities as SDGTs.147  In the four months that followed 9/11 
alone, 157 suspects were listed by the agency and assets valued at $68 
                                                                                                                            
Committee (PCC). The PCC determines whether the USG should designate a particular entity or should pursue 
alternative legal or diplomatic strategies in order to achieve U.S. interests. As part of the PCC process, OFAC's 
designation proposal will usually be vetted by the consultative parties specified by the EO [No. 13,224].”  
Testimony of R. Richard Newcomb, Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control, before the House Financial 
Services Subcommittee on Oversight  
and Investigations, June 16, 2004, available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js1729.htm. 
141 See Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development v. Ashcroft  333 F.3d 156, 162 (D.C. Cir.  2003) 
(describing the standard of review of designation decisions). 
142 They are “freezures” because the government seems to seize the asset, but, it has argued, not in a way that 
implicates the Fourth Amendment’s search and seizure provisions, because it does not search the property it has 
frozen.  Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development v. Ashcroft, 219 F.Supp.2d 57, 67 (D.D.C. 2002). 
143 Indeed, OFAC has taken the position that blocking orders pending investigation are not final agency 
action ripe for review.  Global Relief Foundation, Inc. v. O'Neill  315 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir. 2002) (“appellees' 
suggestion of mootness is that GRF 's current requests are limited to its status pending final administrative 
resolution”).  In a similar vein, the viability of novel constitutional claims that defendants may be able to dream 
up, makes judicial review problematic. 
144 As the district court noted in the Holy Land Foundation litigation, “If [OFAC’s] reasons and policy 
choices ... conform to certain minimal standards of rationality ... the rule is reasonable and must be upheld,” Holy 
Land Foundation for Relief and Development v. Ashcroft, 219 F.Supp.2d 57, 67 (D.D.C. 2002); Islamic American 
Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F.Supp.2d 34, 45 (D.D.C. 2005) (“This Court recognizes that the 
plaintiff is at an inherent disadvantage as it is not able to review and analyze the administrative record in its 
entirety, but rather is limited only to those portions of the administrative record that are not classified”).  For an 
example of the kinds of claims that charities have raised against OFAC, see Compl., BIF v. Ashcroft, No. 02 CR 
414, (N.D.Ill. 2002), paras. 40-48, available at 
http://files.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/bifashcroft013002cmp.pdf.  
145 See Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development v. Ashcroft  333 F.3d 156, 162 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(“the actions of the Treasury Department in designating HLF as a SDGT are governed by the judicial review 
provisions of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)”). 
146 OFAC lists its enforcement actions at E:\Link to Enforcement Actions by Year-U.S. Treasury - Civil 
Penalties Information.htm. 
147 Newcomb, supra note 140. 
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million were frozen.148  By 2004, Treasury Department officials were 
crowing that they had frozen $200 million in assets since 9/11.149 
Perhaps most notably, Treasury has announced investigations of a 
number of charities based in the United States, and subsequently frozen all 
of their property.  We use the record of OFAC’s practice against charities as 
a yardstick for evaluating the effectiveness of this civil administrative 
mechanism of terror-fighting. 
 
2. Inexpertise 
 
The sort of regulation that OFAC has been called upon to do since 
9/11 is nothing like the regulation that the office was created to implement. 
The agency began as an administrative office that distributed export 
licenses and ensured that banks did not release the assets of foreign 
countries with whom the United States was at war.150  It was created after 
World War II to enforce the dictates of the Trading with the Enemy Act 
(TWEA)151 – and had, until the 1990s, defined “enemy” as nations with 
whom the United States was at war, either cold or hot.152  OFAC oversaw 
the limits on trade with these nations, and ensured that the assets of the 
adverse country located in the United States were not repatriated.  The 
office focused on states like Cuba.  Between 1990 and 2003, OFAC 
conducted 10,683 Cuba-related investigations and imposed $8 million in 
fines between 1990 and 2003; by comparison, during the same period, 
OFAC conducted 93 investigations into terrorists, and imposed only $9,425 
in fines.153 
                                                 
148 Kevin Johnson, U.S. Freezes Fewer Terror Assets, USA TODAY, January 30, 2006, at A1.  The pace of 
designation and asset freezes has since slowed somewhat, and recently, annual freeze order takes declined to $4.5 
million in 2005.  Id. 
149 Testimony of Juan Carlos Zarate, Assistant Secretary Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes U.S. 
Department of the Treasury Before the House Financial Services Subcommittees on Domestic and International 
Monetary Policy, Trade and Technology and Oversight and Investigations, available at 
www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js1971.htm (claiming that OFAC had “seized over $200 million of terrorist-
related funds worldwide”). 
150 In its early history, OFAC was described as “a minor Treasury Department bureau.”  American Airways 
Charters, Inc. v. Regan,  746 F.2d 865, 876, (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Greene, J. concurring). 
151 As one commentator explained: 
The statutory basis for U.S. economic sanctions in the twentieth century dates back to the 
enactment of the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) in 1917, six months after the United States 
entered World War I. As originally enacted, the TWEA gave the President broad powers in times of 
war to regulate or prohibit transactions involving property in which a foreign country or national 
thereof had any interest. The TWEA was subsequently amended in 1933 to give the President authority 
to exercise his TWEA powers in response to peace-time national emergencies. 
Stanley J. Marcuss, Grist For The Litigation Mill In U.S. Economic Sanctions Programs, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L 
BUS. 501-02 (1999). see also Rudolph Lehrer, Comment, Unbalancing The Terrorists' Checkbook: Analysis Of 
U.S. Policy In Its Economic War On International Terrorism, 10 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 333, 336 (2002) 
(discussing the history of the scheme). 
152 The United States also imposed sanctions pursuant to the foreign policy export control authority 
contained in the Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401-20. See Marcuss, supra note __ at 502 
(discussing this statutory scheme). 
153 Laura Donahue, Anti-Terrorist Finance In The United Kingdom And United States  27 MICH. J. 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art50
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But beginning in the 1990s, and rapidly accelerating after 9/11, 
OFAC has shifted its focus from countries to individuals, most notably 
individuals and organizations inside the United States. With OFAC’s new 
responsibilities has come hypertrophied growth.  Between 1986 and 2004, 
the office expanded from ten employees to 144, while its budget has 
increased from almost nothing to $22 million per year.154  OFAC now 
blocks asset transfers of at least $1 million, and as much as $35 million, per 
week.155  Treasury has also created an Office of Intelligence Analysis, 
which helps to prepare the cases on SDGTs.156 
In placing new assets, including many nonfinancial assets, in the hands 
of financial regulators, this new scheme has put the agency in the odd 
position of overseeing – indeed, dispossessing – organizations and 
individuals that the government has concluded promote or support terrorism 
– or at least, are worth investigating further for those reasons, and on 
prosecuting, rather than cooperating, with regulateds.157 
 The charitable cases exemplify the new responsibilities with which 
the agency has been tasked.  Those responsibilities have placed the agency 
in the role of investigating ordinary Americans for links with terrorism, 
taking control of the property of those people it suspects might be so linked, 
and, in some cases, overseeing and running the property that it takes.  It is 
all a very new role for banking regulators. 
Three months after 9/11, OFAC took over three Islamic charities, 
the Holy Land Foundation, the Benevolence International Foundation, and 
the Global Relief Foundation, including the two largest in America.  These 
three charities provided money to a diverse set of beneficiaries, including, 
of course, a number of worthy causes.158  But not all the links the charities 
created with the Islamic world were suspicionless.  The Holy Land 
Foundation was a principally Palestinian-oriented institution and its critics 
accused it of supporting Hamas, a Palestinian organization linked with 
terrorism.159  The director of the Benevolence International Foundation 
                                                                                                                            
INT'L L. 303, 435 n.349 (2003) (citing newspaper and government reports). 
154 See David Ivanovich, Case Puts Agency In Spotlight; Secretive Unit Of The Treasury Is Responsible For 
Keeping Economic Sanctions In Place, Feb. 26, 2006 HOUS. CHRON., available at 
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/chronicle/3686135.html;  Newcomb, supra note __. 
155 See Newcomb, supra note __. 
156 See http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/oia/. 
157 “The actual effectiveness of OFAC's regulatory programs … is much more dependant upon voluntary 
implementation and compliance with its rules by the regulated community than on the agency's own enforcement 
actions.”  Peter L. Fitzgerald, Managing "Smart Sanctions" Against Terrorism Wisely, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 957, 
964 (2002) (symposium issue). 
158 The charities focused most of their efforts on providing short and long term relief to Muslim victims of 
natural disasters. See notes 158-160 (providing specific examples of the causes taken on by the Holy Land 
Foundation, the Benevolence International Foundation, and the Global Relief Foundation). 
159 The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development was a charity headquartered in Richardson, 
Texas.  The charity’s main objective was to help Palestinian refugees in the Middle East, but it provided 
humanitarian aid and relief to individuals and communities (primarily Muslim and Arab) in other Middle Eastern 
countries and the United States.  For example, in 2000, the charity raised $13 million to help Turkish earthquake 
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ultimately admitted to supplying non-military goods to Chechen and 
Bosnian rebels.160  And the Global Relief Foundation had been linked to the 
Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, among other countries.161  Later, OFAC 
moved to freeze the assets – pending investigation – of Al-Barakat, an 
organization primarily devoted to Africa, though it later acknowledged that 
they could find no evidence linking the organization to terrorism.162  In 
2004, OFAC froze the assets of Islamic American Relief Foundation, an 
African-centered charity,163 and the U.S. branch of the Al-Haramain Islamic 
Foundation, a Saudi charity.164  Most recently, OFAC blocked, pending 
investigation, access to the assets of KindHearts, a Toledo charity.165 
All of these Islamic charities – each with multimillion dollar budgets 
and varied programs in a number of countries166 – were shut down in every 
particular, and not only by freezing bank accounts, but also by freezing the 
rest of their property, including offices and the supplies in them – 
computers, files, pens and pencils.  In the Holy Land Foundation freezure, 
OFAC removed all of the furniture from the charity’s offices.167  In the case 
of the Benevolence International Foundation, OFAC seized personal 
                                                                                                                            
victims and Muslim refugees in Kosovo and Albania while also operating food pantries in places like Paterson, 
New Jersey.  Adam Lisberg, FBI Probes 2 Muslim Charities in North Jersey; Looking for Links to Terror Groups, 
The Record, p.a18 (October 6, 2001). 
160 The Benevolence International Foundation (BIF) was a U.S. tax-exempt not-for-profit organization 
whose stated purpose was to conduct humanitarian relief projects throughout the world.  The organization’s 
website claimed to help “those afflicted by wars…providing short-term relief such as emergency food 
distribution, and then moves on to long term projects providing education and self-sufficiency to the children, 
widowed, refugees, injured and staff of vital governmental institutions."  The BIF was incorporated in the State of 
Illinois on March 30, 1992 and operated around the world, in places like Bosnia, Chechnya, Pakistan, China, 
Ingushetia, Russia, and other nations.  On November 19, 2002, the group was classified as a terrorist group 
financier by the United States Department of Treasury. Treasury Designates Benevolence International 
Foundation and Related Entities as Financiers of Terrorism, U.S. Dept. of Treas., November 19, 2002 
(http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po3632.htm). 
161 The Global Relief Foundation (GRF), also known as Fondation Secours Mondial or FSM, was an Islamic 
charity based in Bridgeville, IL until it was raided and shut down on December 14, 2001 and labeled a 
"specifically-designated global terrorist" by the U.S. Treasury Department in 2002.  Before being shut down, the 
group claimed its mission was to provide care, support and relief to people in need throughout the world. Treasury 
Department Statement Regarding the Designation of the Global Relief Foundation, U.S. Dept. of Treas., October 
18, 2002 (www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po3553.htm). 
162 For an analysis of the benighted Al-Barakat investigation, see 9/11 COMMISSION MONOGRAPH at 67-86.  
For the government’s announcement of its action against IARA, see Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Office 
of Public Affairs, Treasury Designates Global Network, Senior Officials of IARA for Supporting bin Laden, 
Others (Oct. 13, 2004), available at http:// www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js2025.htm, and for a critical analysis, 
see Laila Al-Marayati, American Muslim Charities: Easy Targets In The War On Terror, 25 PACE L. REV. 321, 
327 (2005) (symposium issue). 
163 Islamic American Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F.Supp.2d 34, 45 (D.D.C. 2005) 
(upholding designation of charity). 
164 Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. Bush, CV 06-274KI Compl. (on file with authors). 
165 Lawsuit information tk, http://www.cair-net.org/default.asp?Page=articleView&id=39012&theType=NB. 
166 “In almost every case, the amount of money from any organization was estimated to be less than 10 
percent of the group’s proceeds.”   Douglas Farah, Technological and Financial Responses to Terrorism, 13 n.6, 
http://www.douglasfarah.com/pdfs/NAF-Final.pdf.  GRF reported more than $5 million in contributions to the 
IRS in 2000, 90% of which it sent overseas.  Victoria B. Bjorklund, Jennifer I. Reynoso, & Abbey Hazlett, 
Terrorism And Money Laundering: Illegal Purposes And Activities, 25 PACE L. REV. 321, 335 (2005) (symposium 
issue).  See also 9/11 COMMISSION MONOGRAPH at 53. 
167 Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development v. Ashcroft,  219 F.Supp.2d 57, 64 (N.D.Tex. 2002) 
(“OFAC … removed from HLF headquarters, all documents, computers, and furniture”) 
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computers as well as business records.168  After designating Al Barakat as a 
SDGT, as one Treasury Department official explained, “Treasury agents 
ended up shutting down eight al Barakat offices in the United States” – 
mistakenly, as it turned out.169   
 This civil process became decidedly novel after OFAC officials had 
taken possession of the charities, because they then had to operate them.170  
OFAC has had to decide whether to permit the charities it has dispossessed 
to cover basic operating expenses like rent, or to pay for attorneys.171  It has 
had to evaluate requests to apply the frozen funds to new charities, to decide 
whether to distribute religious literature impounded in the freezure,172 and 
to venture into the housing market to satisfy the tax bills of those whose 
assets have been frozen.173 
 In freezing the assets of charities, OFAC did not move against 
financial institutions at all and found itself engaging in activities that looked 
a lot like criminal law enforcement.  The fit between the powers that OFAC 
traditionally had as a bank regulator and the actions that it took as a quasi-
criminal prosecutor is decidedly uneven.  The dramatic effect that it had on 
Muslim charities in America – all of the charities seized have been 
paralyzed – is attributable in part to the strange relationship between 
OFAC’s civil powers and quasi-criminal responsibilities. 
 
3. Overdiscretion 
 
Inexpertise is not the only problem that OFAC has faced in 
administering its news rules.  Observers, including the 9/11 commission 
staff, have expressed concerns about the problems inherent in OFAC asset 
                                                 
168 Benevolence Intern. Foundation, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 200 F.Supp.2d 935, 936 (N.D.Ill. 2002). 
169 Jimmy Gurule, Under Secretary of Treasury for Enforcement, Update on Tracking the Financial Assets of 
Terrorists: One Year Later (Sept, 9, 2002), available at http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/13337.htm. 
170 For example, OFAC must decide whether to pay creditors of the charity.  See Pamela M. Keeney, 
Comment, Frozen Assets of Terrorists and Terrorist Supporters: A Proposed Solution to the Creditor Collection 
Problem, 21 BANK. DEV. J. 301 (2004) (noting that asset freezes prevent creditors of the freeze targets from 
collecting their debts). 
171 See Compl., BIF v. Ashcroft, No. 02 CR 414, (N.D.Ill. 2002), paras. 23-25, available at 
http://files.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/bifashcroft013002cmp.pdf.  Cf. also Jill M. 
Troxel, Note, Office of Foreign Assets Control Regulations: Making Attorneys Choose Between Compliance and 
the Attorney-Client Relationship, 24 REV. LITIG. 637 (2005) (discussing OFAC regulations regulating the 
attorney-client relationship by expressly prohibiting some legal services and requiring a license for others); Anne 
Beck and Sylvia Tonova, Current Developments 2003-2004: No Legal Representation Without Governmental 
“interposition”, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 597 (2004) (discussing Executive Order No. 13,304, which prohibited 
the contribution of services to those whose funds had been blocked, and the effect on attorneys representing such 
clients). 
172 See Compl., para. 9, Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation v. Ashcroft, No. 06 CV 583MO (complaint on file 
with author) (seeking distribution of “thousands of volumes of religious literature, including Qur’ans, written 
commentary on the life of the Prophet Muhammad, and other materials designed to explain Islam to both 
adherents and non-adherents”). 
173 Mark Freeman, Seda Home Sold, May 5, 2006 Mail Tribune at 5, available at 
http://www.mailtribune.com/archive/2006/0505/local/stories/5maysedahousesold.htm. 
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freezes, with their heavy effects and light process.174  Because OFAC can 
destroy any entity with its freeze-before-investigation powers, and because 
designation decisions are not subject to much review, the post-9/11 agency 
has become a case study in overdiscretion.   
The broad discretion OFAC has been afforded has been exacerbated 
by a failure of executive branch supervsision, and an unwillingness to 
define its new regulatory powers with precision.  The result has been a 
freezures that have failed to result in any counter-terrorism prosecutions – 
evidence that OFAC was on to something when it acted against its 
suspects.175 
First, it is not clear that OFAC’s supervisors have been able to keep 
up with everything the agency has been doing in the post-9/11 explosion of 
its business.  In October, the Government Accountability Office concluded 
that the Treasury Department "lacks meaningful performance measures to 
assess its terrorist designation and asset blocking efforts."176 
Second, OFAC has not been willing to limit its discretion with 
guidance as to what exactly constitutes dealing with SDGTs – a degree of 
vagueness that has become a tradition with the agency.177  As we will see, 
this vagueness has particularly burdened would-be Islamic donors, who 
have expressed exasperation and confusion as to which charities are at risk 
for freezure orders.178 
The results have been predictably unimpressive.  Like most terrorist 
actions, the 9/11 attack was a low-tech, inexpensively financed operation, 
and efforts to freeze the assets of charities that – at best tenuously – were 
linked to al Qaeda, have been, at the very least, controversial.179  The 9//11 
                                                 
174 See, e.g., 9/11 COMMISSION MONOGRAPH at 112 (“Although in practice a number of agencies typically 
review and agree to the action, there is no formal administrative process, let alone any adjudication of guilt. 
Although this provision is necessary in rare emergencies when the government must shut down a terrorist 
financier before OFAC can marshal evidence to support a formal designation, serious consideration should be 
given to placing a strict and short limit on the duration of such a temporary blocking.”); Laila Al-Marayati, 
American Muslim Charities: Easy Targets In The War On Terror, 25 PACE L. REV. 321 (2005) (symposium issue) 
(arguing that the freezes have victimized Muslims who had nothing to do with terror). 
175 BIF only resulted in one non-terrorism-related guilty plea, see supra note ?? and accompanying text, 
while the Global Relief Foundation was never prosecuted. 
176 Kevin Johnson, U.S. Freezes Fewer Terror Assets, USA TODAY, January 30, 2006, at A1 (quoting the 
GAO report). 
177 David Ivanovich, Case Puts Agency In Spotlight; Secretive Unit Of The Treasury Is Responsible For 
Keeping Economic Sanctions In Place, Feb. 26, 2006 HOUS. CHRON., available at 
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/chronicle/3686135.html (“OFAC experts say the agency keeps its rules 
vague”). 
178 See infra notes __ and accompanying text. 
179 In the words of the commission: 
Nothing the hijackers did would have alerted any bank personnel to their being criminals, 
let alone terrorists bent on mass murder. Their transactions were routine and caused no 
alarm. Their wire transfers, in amounts from $5,000 to $70,000, were utterly anonymous 
in the billions of dollars moving through the international financial system on a daily 
basis. Their bank transactions, typically large deposits followed by many small ATM or 
credit card withdrawals, were entirely normal, especially for foreign students living in the 
United States. No financial institution filed a suspicious activity report (SAR) and, even 
with benefit of hindsight, none of them should have. 
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Commission has explained that so far, the asset freezes that have been 
enacted  
were undertaken with limited evidence, and some were overbroad, 
resulting in legal challenges. Faced with having to defend actions in 
courts that required a higher standard of evidence than was provided 
by the intelligence that supported the designations in the first place, 
the United States …[was] forced to “unfreeze” assets.180  
The result of affording OFAC so much discretion to freeze assets – 
especially to freeze assets pending investigation – is that control over the 
important decisions to freeze has been delegated down.  This putatively 
crucial component of the war on terrorism has been administered by mid-
level bureaucrats in the Treasury Department who have been given the 
authority to interpret very broad grants of authority.  
 
4. Fit 
 
Although OFAC’s conduct in the war on terror is perhaps most 
obviously a problem of inexpert banking supervisors taking on the law 
enforcement role of taking down suspected allies of the terrorists, and 
although that inexpertise has been exacerbated by a failure of either the 
executive branch or courts to adequately constrain the agency’s freezure 
powers, perhaps the most troubling aspect of repurposing the banking 
regulators to fight terrorism is the change in focus that it has required in the 
agency.  Where before it monitored a regulated industry to ensure that 
Cuba, North Korea, and Vietnam and other foreign powers did not make 
use of American financial institutions, now its regulatory purview reaches 
far beyond banking.  As the post-9/11 executive order has made clear, 
OFAC now has the capacity to expose extraordinarily serious regulatory 
punishment on anyone, domestic or foreign, suspected of association with 
terrorists.181  But it is by no means clear that the agency’s supervision of a 
regulated industry has made it capable of searching for elusive links with 
terrorism among not just regulateds, but all Americans. 
 
5. The Effect On Proxies 
 
 OFAC’s sanctions depend on a second-order form of regulation of 
terrorists, by imposing watch requirements on institutions that the terrorists 
might use.  But it is unlikely that terrorists will use charities or banks in an 
open, public way – let alone clear that terrorists depend to an important 
                                                                                                                            
9/11 COMMISSION MONOGRAPH at 53.   
180 9/11 COMMISSION MONOGRAPH at 47. 
181 See supra notes ?? and accompanying text. 
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degree on the abilities to move and launder substantial funds through banks 
or other institutions.  Thus OFAC has become a heavy-handed regulator of 
proxies for terrorists, probably without actually curtailing the limited access 
that terrorists need to the financial system.  Two proxies in particular have 
been affected: Muslims and financial institutions.  
The part of the public most burdened by the new OFAC 
designations has been American Muslims, who are obligated by their 
religion to give to charity, but who have found their donations after 9/11 to 
be fraught with new risks.182  The reaction of Islamic advocacy groups has 
been predictably negative.183 
Moreover, as the number of individuals and organizations 
designated has grown, the record-keeping burdens on the banks – and, 
indeed, anyone who works with money, either formally or informally184 – 
have grown.  On January 12, 2006, OFAC issued guidance for banks for 
compliance with its requirements.  The guidance requires banks to 
implement internal controls for identifying suspicious accounts and 
transactions, including a set of written procedures for new accounts, old 
accounts, and all transactions; an (at least) annual testing process of the 
compliance program, overseen by auditors; the designation of a 
“compliance officer” responsible for the day-to-day oversight of the OFAC 
compliance program; and the creation of a training program.185  The 
penalties imposed by OFAC for failure to comply with these requirements 
range from the low five figures to over one million dollars.186  Since 1993, 
the office has collected nearly $30 million for compliance program 
violations.187   
OFAC’s new guidance to financial institutions gives a sense of the 
amount of work banks are supposed to do to identify and find SDGT 
transactions.  The Department of Justice has admitted that “OFAC sanctions 
are constantly changing and complex.”188  A laundry list of consultants – 
ranging from linguistic psychologists to data-miners – have tried to fill this 
                                                 
182 This charitable obligation is known as Zakat and is rooted in the Koran.  For a discussion, see Laila Al-
Marayati, American Muslim Charities: Easy Targets In The War On Terror, 25 PACE  L. REV. 321 (2005). 
183 See, e.g., 9/11 COMMISSION MONOGRAPH at 111 (discussing this reaction); Sakeena Mirza and Ameena 
Qazi, "Robbing the Poor," al-Talib, vol. 12, no. 3, at http://www.al-talib.com/articles/v12_i3_a04.htm. 
184 As OFAC has said, “All U.S. persons must comply with OFAC regulations, including all U.S. citizens 
and permanent resident aliens regardless of where they are located, all persons and entities within the United 
States, all U.S. incorporated entities and their foreign branches.”  OFAC, Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/faq/#sdn.  There are no de minimis transactions permitted with 
designated entities. 
185 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Anti-Money Laundering Programs for Dealers in Precious 
Metals, Stones, or Jewels, 68 Fed. Reg. 8480-02 n.1 (Feb. 21, 2003).  See also Joel Feinberg, OFAC Issues 
Interim Final Rule Describing Sound Compliance Program, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING, 2006 WLNR 1431613, 
Jan. 26, 2006. 
186 Newcomb, supra note 140. 
187 Newcomb, supra note 140. 
188 Lester M. Joseph, Anti-Money Laundering Update, 1378 PLI/CORP 627, 656 (2003) (describing the 
OFAC regime, offering the perspective of a senior criminal prosecutor in the Department of Justice). 
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gap by developing programs and training designed to help financial 
institutions keep track of the growing lists of individuals.189  But such 
programs, are, of course, expensive. 
Moreover, compliance is not just an issue for financial institutions.  
It is one for a broad array of domestic entities never before subject to the 
agency’s control.  Consider the difficulties of compliance with new 
guidance – rare guidance, for OFAC – to charities.  In the case of charities, 
OFAC has suggested the adoption of a “risk-based” approach to the 
monitoring of charitable aid recipients.190  Charities have been directed to 
conduct “due diligence” of their recipients (as well as of the charities’ own 
personnel) to ensure that they are not on OFAC-generated watch lists, that 
the donor has some information about the identities of their aid recipients, 
as well as information about the use to which the aid will be put, and that 
the donor continues to monitor recipients after the aid has been given.191 
These putatively voluntary guidelines for charities, in imposing a 
number of reporting and bookkeeping requirements to ensure that they do 
not become conduits for terrorist money, are similar to the requirements 
OFAC imposes on more traditional subjects of its regulation, like banks.192  
As with banks, the government has made no guarantees that 
compliance with the guidelines will exempt charities from prosecution for 
money laundering.193  The department has also issued “best practices”194 
that charitable organizations might follow.  This might create consistency 
across charities, but there is no indication that it would result in a 
particularly desirable regulatory regime.195  
 
6. Postscript 
                                                 
189 Choicepoint is the best know of the data miners.  Bridger Insight, Products, 
http://www.bridgerinsight.choicepoint.com/products.htm.  But see also Language Analysis Systems, OFAC 
Compliance, http://www.las-inc.com/ofac/ofac-compliance.shtml (asking whether financial institutions are 
“Struggling with Assessing OFAC Compliance Software?” and offering the service of linguist and psychologists 
in the name-matching process). 
190 See OFAC, Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-Based 
Charities, 70 Fed. Reg. 73,063, 73,063 (Dec. 8, 2005) (announcing an intention “to assist charities in 
developing a risk-based approach to guard against the threat of diversion of charitable funds for use by terrorists 
and their support networks”).  See also Joseph W. Younker, The "U.S. Department Of The Treasury Anti-Terrorist 
Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best-Practices For U.S.-Based Charities": Sawing A Leg Off The Stool Of 
Democracy, 14 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 865, 866 (2004) (calling for “a flexible, risk-based test more 
in tune with the reality of the nonprofit sector”). 
191 OFAC, Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices For U.S.-Based Charities, 
http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/key-issues/protecting/docs/guidelines_charities.pdf 
192 Dept. of Treasury, Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-Based 
Charities, available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/po36072.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2005). 
193 At any rate, the Department warned the charities that compliance of its guidelines should “not be 
construed to preclude any criminal or civil sanctions by the Department.” U.S. Department Of The Treasury, Anti-
Terrorist Financing Guidelines:Voluntary Best Practices For U.S.-Based Charities (2006), available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/docs/tocc.pdf at 7. 
194 U.S. Department Of The Treasury, Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices For 
U.S.-Based Charities (2006), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/docs/tocc.pdf 
195 See Zaring, supra note __ at __ [NYU L Rev article forthcoming 2006]. 
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 As Treasury continues to designate individuals under the SDGT 
process – and, indeed, has paired its domestic process with an international 
one, using the United Nations and American allies to also designate 
individuals and organizations as subjects of global asset freezes196 - it is 
worth considering the results of this new form of action by the Treasury 
Department so far. 
It is unclear that any of the charities taken over by OFAC actually 
supported terrorism.197  In no case have the charity “freezures” been 
followed by successful prosecutions for violating the criminal laws against 
terrorism – although one charity official pled guilty to providing 
nonmilitary goods to Chechen and Bosnian rebels, neither of which, of 
course, were responsible for the attacks of 9/11. 
This is not surprising.  As the 9/11 commission staff explained, the 
earlier designation of Al Qaeda and the Taliban in 1999 as “Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations” did not prevent the World Trade Center attack.  As 
the Commission notes, “the sanctions were easily circumvented,” and it is 
surpassingly difficult to “find and seize the funds of a clandestine 
worldwide organization like al Qaeda.”198 
To the extent that the regulations are effective at all, their 
effectiveness probably lies primarily in the sense that the government is 
doing something about terrorism when it freezes assets through the low-
cost, lightly reviewed designation process.199  Sanctions like those 
administered by OFAC “are frequently imposed to demonstrate political 
leadership or to claim the moral high ground for domestic or international 
political purposes.”200  That process has also proven to be a surprisingly 
attractive means of obtaining international cooperation, in that the United 
Nations and American allies have also been willing to announce freezes of 
any assets of designated individuals located in their jurisdictions.201  
                                                 
196 Testimony of Stuart A. Levey, Under Secretary, Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, U.S. Department of 
the Treasury Before the Senate Committee on Banking, and Urban Affairs, 872 PLI/Comm 587, 1165 (2004). 
197 As the 9/11 commission staff noted, “A senior government official who led the government’s efforts 
against terrorist financing from 9/11 until late 2003 believed the efforts against the charities were less than a full 
success and, in fact, were a disappointment because neither charity was publicly proved to support terrorism.” 
9/11 COMMISSION MONOGRAPH at 111. 
198 9/11 COMMISSION MONOGRAPH at 185. 
199 As Mariano-Florentino Cuellar has noted, “[e]xecutive officials … may prefer to use their powers to 
create an impression of greater security, even in the absence of the capacity to impose substantial costs on the 
most troubling offenders, or to detect them”  Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, The Mismatch Between State Power and 
State Capacity in Transnational Law Enforcement, Stan. L. School Pub. L. Working Paper No. 70 at 1 (November 
2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=474662. 
200 Peter L. Fitzgerald, Managing "Smart Sanctions" Against Terrorism Wisely,36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 957, 
961 (2002) (symposium issue). 
201 See Laura Donohue, Anti-Terrorist Finance In The United Kingdom And United States  27 MICH. J. INT'L 
L. 303, 426 (2006) (noting that a number of states have started designating individuals,, along with the United 
Nations, and warning that “[t[he United States' refusal to allow any sort of independent arbitration to accompany 
the creation of lists substantially weakened the UN attempt to build a dossier of dangerous individuals. 
Simultaneously, the lack of such a structure opens the door to abuse from other states.”). 
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Ironically, these internationally focused benefits, meager though they are, 
are the aspects of terrorism-financing regulation most closely related to 
OFAC’s original mission. 
 
B. FinCEN and the High Cost of Searching for Money Launderers 
 
The government has tried to prevent criminals from laundering their 
ill-gotten gains for decades, and this anti-money laundering regime has 
always been administered by banking regulators in the Department of the 
Treasury.  In this article, we have argued that civil administrative agencies 
usually fight the war on terror badly.  Can this possibly be true for a 
government agency that has been running comparable civil investigations 
against criminals for decades?202   
In our view, it is.  While the regulation of banks to prevent money 
laundering is not a new administrative task, the post-9/11 regime illustrates 
the perils of the hasty expansion of regulation – a case of overreaction that 
has particularly exacerbated the problems of fit and overdiscretion that, 
along with the problem of inexpertise, typically characterize the results of 
sending bureaucrats to war.  After 9/11, banking regulators have rushed into 
a scheme that substantially affects a set of proxies for terrorists – financial 
institutions – without any indication that the terrorists themselves have been 
affected. 
 
1. The Regulatory Scheme, And How It Changed After 9/11 
 
There was little that was secret about the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 
which was passed to prevent tax evaders and criminals from hiding or 
laundering their taxable or ill-gotten assets in federally regulated banks.203  
In the years that followed, banks and other federally regulated financial 
institutions were required to report to the Department of the Treasury on 
large or otherwise suspicious transactions.204   
After 9/11, the BSA was amended by the Patriot Act to expand the 
reach of the criminal sanctions against money laundering,205 to permit the 
                                                 
202 As some observers have claimed, “economic sanctions are frequently the government's first and principal 
tool to deal with international terrorism.”  Jonathan Grebinar, Responding To Terrorism: How Must A Democracy 
Do It? A Comparison Of Israeli And American Law, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 261, 280 (2003). 
203 31 U.S.C § 5311 et. seq.  See Cal. Bankers Ass'n. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 26-30 (1974) (discussing these 
and the other concerns Congress tried to address in the BSA). 
204 For a description of FinCEN in the pre-9/11 era, see Steven A. Bercu, Toward Universal Surveillance in 
an Information Age Economy, 34 Jurimetrics J. 383, 386-400 (1994). 
205 Among other things, it expanded the number of predicate penalties for a money laundering charge, 
section 1956, and it criminalized the transportation of bulk cash, section, 31 USC 53, and it made the operation of 
an unlicensed money transfer business a general, rather than a specific, intent crime.  18 U.S.C. § 1960.  It added 
the provision of monetary support to the list of crimes under the antiterrorism act. 
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Treasury Department to pursue civil penalties against alleged launderers,206 
and - most notably - to increase the reporting requirements on, and broaden 
the definition of, financial institutions subject to the requirements of the 
act.207  Congressional leaders and executive officials claimed that these new 
laws were designed to stem the flow of money to terrorists.208   
The result has been a repurposing of the part of the Treasury 
Department that implements the money laundering regulations.  The 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, or FinCEN, has been transformed 
from an office that tracked the financial transactions of criminals into one 
that looks, in principal part, for similar transactions by terrorists.209   
FinCEN implements this new regulatory mandate by scrutinizing the 
reports and recordkeeping of banks and other financial institutions.210  In 
theory, it looks for a financial trail that will lead investigators and 
prosecutors to terrorists.211  But in practice, much of what the agency does 
involves the policing of the report-filing programs of the financial 
                                                 
206 See id. § 1956(b).  Under this the statute, any person who engages or attempts to engage in a transaction 
involving more than $10,000 in criminally derived proceeds may be held civilly liable for the value of the 
proceeds or $10,000, whichever is greater.  The statute contains a long-arm jurisdiction provision, via which, A 
foreign "person" is now subject to jurisdiction for a forfeiture action, as long as personal service can be effected 
and one of the following conditions is met: (1) the money laundering offense involved a financial transaction that 
occurred in whole or part in the U.S.; (2) the foreign person (including a foreign bank) converts property in which 
the U.S. has an interest by virtue of a forfeiture order of a U.S. court; or (3) the foreign person is a financial 
institution that maintains a bank account at a financial institution in the U.S.  18 U.S.C. § 1956 
207 For an exhaustive discussion of these new requires, see Robert W. Helm & Kevin K. Babikian, Creating, 
Managing And Distributing Offshore Investment Products: A Legal Perspective, 1471 PLI/CORP 715, 964 (2005) 
(“The USA PATRIOT Act required the Treasury Department to extend CTR reporting requirements under the 
BSA to all trades and businesses -- not just financial institutions.”).  The statue also permits federal authorities to 
share information with financial institutions about the potential targets of investigation.    See 67 Fe. Reg. 60, 579 
(Sep. 26, 2002) (setting forth the implementing regulations for this process).  FinCEN reports that it has processed 
167 such requests for information by federal agencies between February 1, 203 and December 6, 2005. FinCEN, 
FinCEN’s 3143(a) Fact Sheet 3, http://www.fincen.gov/314afactsheet.pdf (Dec. 6, 2005). 
208 See The Financial War on Terrorism and the Administration's Implementation of the Anti-Money 
Laundering Provisions of the USA Patriot Act, Hearings Before Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 
107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002) (statement of Senator Paul Sarbanes) ("The U.S. must lead both by example and by 
promoting concerted international action. Our goal must be not only to apprehend particular individuals, but to cut 
off the pathways in the international financial system along with terrorist and other criminal money moves"), at 
http://banking.senate.gov/02_ 01hrg/012902/sarbanes.htm; id. (statement of Representative John J. LaFalce) 
("[T]he Treasury Secretary's new, more flexible anti-money laundering powers will enable law enforcement to 
tackle with much more effectiveness abuses of our financial system by terrorists and criminals"), at 
http://banking.senate.gov/02_01hrg/012902/lafalce.htm; id. (statement of Michael Chertoff, Assistant Attorney 
General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice) ("Title III of the PATRIOT Act has provided law enforcement 
with important new authority to investigate and prosecute the financing of crime, including terrorism."), at 
http://banking.senate.gov/02_ 01hrg/012902/chertoff.htm.  For more background, and credit for the links, see U.S. 
v. Wray, 2002 WL 31628435, *2 n.5 (D.Virgin Islands). 
209 Treasury Order No. 105-08.  In May 1994, its mission was broadened to include regulatory 
responsibilities.  For more views on money laundering, see Bruce Zaragis, Selected Symposium Remarks 
“Financial Aspects of the War on Terror”: March 18, 2002: The Merging of the Counter-Terrorism and Anti-
Money Laundering Schemes, 34 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 45 (2002); see also Michael P. Malloy, Unfunding 
Terror - Perspectives on Unfunding Terror, 17 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 97 (2004). 
210 In this regard, FinCEN’s work is concentrated on combining information reported under the BSA with 
other government and public information.  This information is then turned over to law enforcement officials, with 
the idea being that they can then build money laundering cases with what they get. 
211 FinCEN declares that its mission includes “Supporting law enforcement, intelligence, and regulatory 
agencies through    sharing and analysis of financial intelligence.” FinCEN, Mission Statement, 
http://www.fincen.gov/af_mission.html (emphasis in original). 
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institutions covered by the BSA and Patriot Act.     
Because the new regulatory regime substantially expanded the 
number of institutions subject to the money laundering reporting 
requirements, tracking the reporting is a big job.  The Patriot Act and its 
implementing regulations expanded the number of financial institutions 
subject to reporting requirements, for the first time covering credit unions, 
futures commission merchants, commodity trading advisors, commodity 
pool operators, and informal or unlicensed transmitters of money.212 That 
last category means that BSA reporting requirements now apply to 
pawnbrokers, loan circles, hawallas, and, possibly, any other person who 
loans money to someone else.213  Loan and finance companies are also 
expressly covered.214  Moreover, the statute gave authority to the Treasury 
Department to further expand the types of institutions covered by the 
reporting requirements.  
  Those subject to the act’s reach must file Suspicious Activity 
Reports with the Department of the Treasury.215  Also, all financial 
institutions must establish anti-money laundering programs, including, as 
one Department of Justice attorney has explained, “at a minimum, the 
development of internal policies, procedures, and controls; the designation 
of a compliance officer; an ongoing employee training program; and an 
independent audit function to test programs.”216  
The Treasury Department has also issued specific minimum 
standard "know your customer" regulations, pursuant to the Patriot Act.   
These regulations require financial institutions to make “reasonable and 
practical” efforts to verify new customers; maintain records of the 
information used to verify them; and consult the lists of terrorists 
promulgated by OFAC.217  Nor are these the only requirements that 
                                                 
212 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2), (c) (2003). 
213 The Act explicitly applies to “underground banking systems,” which it defines as “a business in the 
transmission of funds, including any person who engages as a business in an informal money transfer system or 
any network of people who engage in a business in facilitating the transfer of money … outside the conventional 
financial institutions system.”  31 U.S.C. § 5318 
214 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2), (c); Jeffrey P. Taft & Christina A. LaVera, The Changing Landscape Of Federal 
Money Laundering Laws: An Overview Of The USA Patriot Act And Related Developments,57 CONSUMER FIN. 
L.Q. REP. 109, 111. (2003) (describing the implementation of this provision of the statute). 
215 The Treasury Department has the authority to define financial institutions pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 5312, 
which includes its own broad definition of the term.  The statute itself provides that “each financial institution 
shall establish anti-money laundering programs, including, at a minimum- 
  (A) the development of internal policies, procedures, and controls;  
  (B) the designation of a compliance officer,  
  (C) an ongoing employee training program; and  
  (D) an independent audit function to test programs.  
  31 U.S.C. § 5318(h). 
216 Lester Joseph, Anti-Money Laundering Update, 1378 PLI/Corp 627, 633 (2002). 
217 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h).  For more on the Customer Identification Program, see Jeffrey P. Taft & Christina 
A. LaVera, The Changing Landscape Of Federal Money Laundering Laws: An Overview Of The USA Patriot Act 
And Related Developments,57 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 109, 111. (2003). 
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FinCEN has imposed on banks since the promulgation of the Patriot Act.218  
Complying with FinCEN’s regulatory regime, as was the case with 
OFAC’s, is an involved process – one involved enough to warrant the 
development of a cottage industry of compliance consultants, who offer 
software systems to track transactions, outside training sessions, and a range 
of experts who can advise covered financial institutions as to what they 
must do to meet the Treasury Department’s standards.219  U.S. banks spent 
about $125 million in 2003, and the same again in 2004, to comply with 
FinCEN’s regulatory scheme.220 
 
2. Fit 
 
But all of this civil regulation has done little to affect the 
fundamentally non-civil nature of terrorism.  We have used the term “fit” to 
show how the characteristic form of civil rules – broadly applicably and 
dependent upon voluntary compliance – are ill-suited for counter-terrorism.  
FinCEN’s counter-terrorism regime exemplifies the problems of fit, because 
it has not done much good.  There is little evidence that the new 
administrative regime has affected much of the money laundered:221 federal 
convictions for money laundering have not increased,222 and investigations 
have a failure rate of 99.5%.223   
As with OFAC’s freezes, none of this is at all surprising.  The 9/11 
commission staff concluded that “al Qaeda probably did not use the formal 
financial system to store or transfer funds internally after Bin Ladin moved 
to Afghanistan.”224  And Christina Jackson has observed that “enforcement 
systems designed to unearth the large scale transfers used by money 
launderers are not as adept at identifying the small routine transactions of 
                                                 
218 For example, financial institutions are also now required to file Currency Trading Forms reporting 
transactions “relating to coins and currency received” as well.  See William J. Sweet, Jr., Saul M. Pilchen, & 
Stacie E. McGinn, Summary Of The USA Patriot Act Of 2001 Anti-Money Laundering Provisions, 1289 PLI/CORP 
55, 67 (2002).  On November 3, 2005, pursuant to Section 356 of the USA PATRIOT Act, FinCEN issued 
regulations requiring insurance companies to establish and implement anti-money laundering compliance 
programs, and requiring insurance companies to file suspicious activity reports (SARs).  
http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS_GET_PAGE&nodeId=646; see also 
http://www.fincen.gov/newsrelease10312005.pdf.  The Treasury Department can also add to these reporting 
requirements in the cases where it is particularly suspicious of a pattern of overseas money laundering.   In such 
cases, it can order domestic financial institutions to take “special measures,” imposing additional tracking 
requirements to the paper generated by these suspicious accounts. 
219 For a description of this process, see supra notes __ and accompanying text. 
220 Karen Epper Hoffman, AML Security Emphasizes Detection and Prevention, Jan. 13, 2005 Banking 
Strategies Blog, http://www.bai.org/cs/blogs/bankingstrategiesnews/archive/2005/01/13/505.aspx. 
221 Daniel J. Mitchell, The Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: The Impact on International Philanthropy: 
A Symposium Held at Pace University School of Law December 3, 2004: Fighting Terror and Defending 
Freedom: The Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 25 PACE  L. REV. 219, 222-23 (2005) (symposium issue). 
222 See id. at 223. 
223 See id. 
224 9/11 COMMISSION MONOGRAPH at 25. 
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terrorist cells.”225   
The likelihood that any particular reporting requirement will help to 
catch a terrorist is very low.  As the 9/11 commission staff explained, “For 
terrorist financial transactions, the amount of money is often small or 
consistent with the customer’s profile (such as a charity raising money for 
humanitarian aid) and the transactions seemingly innocuous. As a 
consequence, banks generally are unable to separate suspicious from 
legitimate transactions.”226 
 
3. Overdiscretion 
 
The radical expansion of FinCEN’s administrative scheme has 
created new opportunities for the agency to impose penalties on financial 
institutions that have failed to meet every jot and tittle of the new 
requirements.  It is here that the new discretion afforded an agency 
overseeing a much bigger regulatory scheme becomes most obvious.   
FinCEN has, since 9/11, imposed a staggering number of fines on 
banks for failing to meet its reporting requirements.  Moreover, those fines 
have been extraordinarily large.227  ABN-AMRO, a large European bank, 
has been hit with a $30 million fine (and more from state regulators).228  
Western Union has also been hit with a $30 million fine for its record 
keeping failures.229  And the Department of Justice has brought criminal 
prosecutions for anti-money laundering violations that resulted in a $50 
million civil monetary penalty against AmSouth, and a criminal fine and 
civil monetary penalty against Riggs Bank that, amounting to a total of $43 
million, put the bank out of business.230 
                                                 
225 Christina Jackson, Combating the New Generation of Money Laundering, 4 J. HIGH TECH. L. 139, 143 
(2004). 
226 9/11 COMMISSION MONOGRAPH at 52.  Observers agree: “[s]ome kinds of criminal financial activity - 
whether impelled by intrinsic objectives or a craving for profits - will remain extraordinarily difficult to deter, 
because of offenders' motivations and their ability to substitute among different types of transactions.”  Mariano-
Florentino Cuellar, The Mismatch Between State Power and State Capacity in Transnational Law Enforcement, 
Stan. L. School Pub. L. Working Paper No. 70 at 1 (November 2003), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=474662. 
227 For a list of these fines, not all of which, of course, were related to terrorism, but a great number of which 
were related to recordkeeping, see 
http://www.aquilan.com/documents/Recent%20FinCEN%20Actions.pdf#search=%22fincen%20fines%22.  See 
generally, Aaron R. Hutman, Matthew J. Herrington, Edward J. Krauland, Money Laundering Enforcement and 
Policy, 39 Int’l Law. 649 (2005) (noting significant enforcement actions). 
228 http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/enforcement/2005/20051219/121905attachment3.pdf, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/enforcement/2005/20051219/121905attachment2.pdf 
229 See 
http://www.fincen.gov/western_union_assessment.pdf#search=%22fincen%20fines%20western%20union%22. 
230 See generally, John Mooney, The Hazards of Enforcing Guidance, 31 ADMIN. L. & REG. NEWS 2, 2 (Winter, 
2006).  On AmSouth, FinCEN’s assessment of civil monetary penalty may be found at http://sec.edgar-
online.com/2004/10/12/0000891836-04-000358/Section9.asp (finding, among other things, that “AmSouth failed 
to develop an anti-money laundering program tailored to the risks of its business and reasonably designed, as 
required by law, to prevent the Bank from being used to launder money and finance terrorist activities and to 
ensure compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act.”).  The government’s 2005 Money Laundering Threat Assessment 
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The regulatory industry, as one might imagine, has found the 
increased level of fines to be troubling.  It has accused FinCEN of assessing 
the fines randomly and unpredictably, and has sought more guidance from 
the agency on how it decides to assess fines and why it makes them so 
large.231  As with OFAC, though, FinCEN has not been eager to limit its 
discretion to fine as it wishes.232 
 
4. Inexpertise 
 
Although the Treasury Department has tried to prevent money 
laundering for some time, we see two ways in which the new anti-terrorism 
scheme has failed to make use of that expertise – even apart from the 
question as to whether trying to prevent terrorists from laundering money 
makes sense as a civil administrative scheme at all.   
First, it is by no means clear that the government can handle all of 
this new data.  The result of the recent intensification of the reporting 
regime has been a Treasury Department overwhelmed with paper.  Some 12 
million reports are filed on transactions over $10,000 every year.233  As of 
June 30, 2005, over 2.6 million Suspicious Activity Report forms had been 
filed with FinCEN.234  The suspicious activity reports that are the focus of 
the post-Patriot Act regime have also exploded in number: filings in the first 
six months of 2005 increased 45% over filings during the same period of 
2004 for depositary institutions alone.235  The volume of SAR filings in 
2003 was 453% higher than those filed in 1996.236 As the chair of the 
American Bankers Association testified to Congress, banks filed 43,000 
                                                                                                                            
reported that Riggs was fined for “Riggs National Bank was fined over forty million dollars as a consequence of 
serious deficiencies in its AML program, including in its private banking practice” including loans to “politically 
exposed persons, accepting millions of dollars in deposits under various corporate and individual account names 
and paying little or no attention to suspicious activity in these accounts.” Money Laundering Working Group, 
2005 Money Laundering Threat Assessment, 14 (2005) (available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/js3077_01112005_MLTA.pdf)  See also Timothy O'Brien, 
"Regulators Fine Riggs $25 Million," New York Times, May 14, 2004, available at 
http://www.heraldtribune.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20040514/ZNYT01/405140301. (“The fine stems from 
Riggs's failure over at least the last two years to actively monitor suspect financial transfers through Saudi 
Arabian and Equatorial Guinean accounts held by the bank. The accounts are still being scrutinized as possible 
conduits for terrorist funds or for the proceeds of graft.”). 
231 Byrne, supra note __. 
232 See supra notes __ and accompanying text. 
233 American Community Banking Association, Comment, Request for Burden Reduction 
Recommendations; Money Laundering, Safety and Soundness, and Securities Rules; Economic Growth and 
Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996 Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 5571 (February 3, 2005), 
http://www.americascommunitybankers.com/government/scripts/government_view_comment.asp?ID=1142 , 
(“financial institutions have filed over 12 million CTRs each year since 1995”) 
234 FinCEN, Industry Forum: An Overview of Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) Training Elements in 2005, 1 
(Feb. 2006), available at http://www.fincen.gov/sars/sars_by_numb_issue5.pdf. 
235 FinCEN, Industry Forum: An Overview of Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) Training Elements in 2005, 2 
(Feb. 2006), available at http://www.fincen.gov/sars/sars_by_numb_issue5.pdf. 
236 The SAR Activity Review: By the Numbers, Issue 2, at 1 (May 2004), 
available at http://www.fincen.gov/bythenumbersissue2.pdf. 
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such reports per month with OFAC in 2005 – and that was a 40% increase 
over the prior year.237  There is no indication that FinCEN, even a FinCEN 
that has expanded precipitously since 9/11, knows how to manage all of 
these reports.238  In fact, the former director of FinCEN complained in 2004 
that too many of these SARs were being filed by banks.239  The haphazard 
nature of the fines that FinCEN has imposed has led some observers to 
question whether the agency has a policy in place to sort through each of 
the reports. 
Second, the broad scope of the new regulations suggests not an 
agency applying old skills to new areas, but an agency that may be engaged 
in regulatory empire-building.  Some observers have concluded that the 
complexity, detail, and public-private nature of the regulatory scheme – 
FinCEN has not only imposed a broad new laundry list of reporting 
requirements on financial institutions after 9/11, but has also "encourage[d] 
further cooperation" among financial institutions in preventing terrorists 
from laundering funds – is expanding FinCEN’s reach beyond its traditional 
regulatory purview.240 
Finally, it is worth briefly noting that some observers question the 
enterprise of tasking financiers with anti-terrorism responsibilities – a job in 
which the regulateds are as inexperienced as the regulators.  As Larry 
Cunningham has noted, there is “reason to doubt whether the tools auditors 
apply to old-fashioned financial statement audits work as well when applied 
in” non-traditional exercises such as “thwart[ing] terrorist financing.”241 
 
5. Impact On Proxies 
 
The new administrative procedures designed to combat money 
laundering are extraordinarily overbroad – because they ask almost any 
                                                 
237 Testimony of John Byrne, Chairman, American Bankers Ass’n, before the House Banking Ctte, May 4, 
2005, http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/CDA74BEE-3E41-42D4-B7E0-
C32E94B32D07/39275/AMLTestimonyJBMay2005.pdf 
238 As one banker has wondered: “We've got all of this data; how much actually led to something? That's a 
question all of us have. After all this effort and all these resources, what success have we had?”  Annie Baxter, 
Personal Information Becomes Post-9/11 Target, Sept. 6, 2006 Marketplace, available at 
http://marketplace.publicradio.org/shows/2006/09/08/PM200609086.html (quoting Bill Patient BankCherokee of 
Minnesota's compliance officer). 
239 See Hutman, supra note ?? at 654. 
240 Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Notice, Comment, And The Regulatory State: A Case Study From The Usa 
Patriot Act, 28 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 3, 3 (Summer, 2003)  As Florentino-Cuellar observed elsewhere, “the 
rule is one that applies to virtually anyone in the country, … and … the statute gives the agency a lot of latitude 
with the rule.” Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Mismatch Between State Power And State Capacity In 
Transnational Law Enforcement, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 15, 32 (2004).  In fact, the new regulations selected by 
the agency, are designed, in his view, to facilitate financial institutions disclosures to the Treasury Department the 
accounts of people suspected of being involved in money laundering and terrorist financing.  See 67 Fed. Reg. 
60,579 (Sept. 26, 2002). 
241 Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal And Limits Of Internal Controls To Fight Fra Ud, Terrorism, 
Other Ills  29 J. CORP. L. 267, 271 (2004). 
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money-related business to implement a complex reporting scheme on 
almost all of the money it sees.  In doing so, we see the problems of using 
civil administrative process – which is best suited for broad rules of general 
applicability – to root out terrorists uninterested in accepting the benefits of 
regulation and participating in an administrative scheme. 
The reporting requirements take millions of hours of bank employee 
time to comply with the regulations – in addition to further hours on the part 
of government officials to go through the money laundering reports that are 
filed.  The question, as always, remains whether the new regulations are 
really likely to deter terrorists, and so are worth the costs. A KMPG survey 
reveals that 94% of North American banks reported increased costs in 
complying with FinCEN’s rules, with one-third of respondents indicating 
their costs have more than doubled over the last three years.242 
More generally, banking industry representatives have complained 
that compliance with these programs is supervised idiosyncratically and 
differently among different banking regulators,243 and that the multiple 
regulators involved in the process make for a complex regulatory regime.244 
All of this is a substantial burden on financial institutions, affecting 
their information systems, employee training, and strategic planning for the 
future, and even possible mergers and acquisitions. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The question, then, is whether it makes sense to use a civil scheme 
that regulates financial institutions that volunteer to be under federal control 
to track possible customers of those institutions who have no interest in 
furthering the federal regulatory scheme.  The search for the needle in the 
                                                 
242 Karen Epper Hoffman, AML Security Emphasizes Detection and Prevention, Jan. 13, 2005 Banking 
Strategies Blog, http://www.bai.org/cs/blogs/bankingstrategiesnews/archive/2005/01/13/505.aspx. 
243 Testimony of John Byrne, Chairman, American Bankers Ass’n, before the House Banking Ctte, May 4, 
2005, http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/CDA74BEE-3E41-42D4-B7E0-
C32E94B32D07/39275/AMLTestimonyJBMay2005.pdf pp2-3.  One banker has estimated that implementing the 
new know-your-customer rules consume 40% of his time.  See Annie Baxter, Personal Information Becomes 
Post-9/11 Target, Sept. 6, 2006 Marketplace, available at 
http://marketplace.publicradio.org/shows/2006/09/08/PM200609086.html (quoting Bill Patient BankCherokee of 
Minnesota's compliance officer). 
244 It’s not just FinCEN involved in this new regulatory process.  The federal banking regulators (principally 
the Federal Reserve, OCC – itself technically a part of Treasury – and FDIC), have imposed reporting 
requirements on their regulated industries pursuant to the Patriot Act, as has the SEC, NYSE, and NASD.  Per the 
stock exchanges, all broker/dealers must implement an anti-money laundering compliance program and must file 
suspicious activity reports (SARs), which identify and describe transactions that raise suspicions of illegal 
activity, and to establish certain procedures with regard to "correspondent accounts" maintained for foreign banks.  
See Joseph, supra note __, at 661. 
As for the banking regulators, nothing less than the abilities of financial institutions to merge is at stake.  
The Patriot Act requires federal banking regulators to consider "the effectiveness of the” bank or thrift “in 
combating money laundering activities, including in overseas branches” when the bank or thrift seeks to merge 
with another financial institution.  bank holding company act; bank something act.  "the effectiveness of any 
insured depository institution involved in the proposed merger transaction in combating money laundering 
activities, including in overseas branches" in connection with any bank or thrift merger. 
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haystack here is a very costly one, and we think that looking to civil 
officials to handle this massive effort to smoke out terrorists – who do not 
participate in high finance at any rate – illustrates the damage that can be 
inflicted on a regulated industry by expanding the scope of regulation to try 
to reach the sort of people who don’t want to be regulate or two participate 
in a regulatory scheme. 
 
IV.  QUALIFICATIONS TO THE ANALYSIS 
 
We now turn to a number of potential objections to our analysis: (A) 
that our blanket condemnation of civil administrative counter-terrorism 
would preclude some efficient and effective rules from being enacted – the 
locked cockpit door rule objection; (B) that the substantial costs imposed by 
terrorist incidents make it worth mobilizing the administrative state even if 
that state is usually ineffective at identifying terrorists – the 1% problem; 
(C) that our claims about fit do not accurately characterize everything the 
administrative state does – the organizational flexibility objection; and (D), 
that one twofold advantage of generally applicable rules is that they reduce 
the risk of racial profiling or other undesirable narrowcasting of 
counterterrorism efforts, while engaging the many in a large government 
enterprise – the victory garden objection. 
 
A. The Locked Cockpit Door Objection 
 
It is probably the case that among the vast variety of actions that the 
civil administrative state might take, some might principally deter terrorists, 
and possibly do so effectively.   
Our claim is not that it never makes sense to use the civil 
bureaucracy to combat terror – just that it almost never makes sense.  We 
acknowledge, for example, the Federal Aviation Administration’s rule 
requiring airlines to lock their cockpit doors so that passengers could not get 
in during flight.  The Aviation and Transportation Security Act, passed 
shortly after 9/11, authorized the FAA to require reinforced, locked cockpit 
doors during flight on both domestic and international flights.245 The agency 
duly passed a rule requiring the locked doors, noting that it was being 
enacted “in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against 
four U.S. commercial airplanes.”246 
The FAA rule was one of general applicability, civil in nature, and 
                                                 
245 See Pub. L. 107-71; 115 Stat. 597.  Section 104 of that Act required the administrator of the agency to 
regulate access to cockpits – if it was not already apparent that the agency had such authority from its broad 
powers to regulate the airplane industry to ensure flight safety. 
246 Flightcrew Compartment Access and Door Designs  67 Fed. Reg. 2112, 2112 (Jan 15, 2002).  
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may be a good idea.  Locked cabin doors might, many have surmised, have 
prevented 9/11 from happening.247   to prove the rule we propose, for this is 
an example of agency action that can pass our three tests of fit, balance 
between discretion and oversight, and expertise.   
Here, rather than targeting a proxy group, this rule directly targets 
terrorists, who must be among the few who would attempt to illicitly open a 
cockpit door during flight.  Rather than requiring the FAA to do something 
outside its area of expertise and beyond its ordinary goals and mandate, this 
rule called on the FAA to act within its expertise in overseeing airline 
standards and plane safety. The question of oversight and discretion in this 
case is admittedly an open one, as the FAA may delegate inspection and 
confirmation duties to low level bureaucrats, and may or may not provide 
adequate oversight of these duties.  We do concede that it may be possible 
to conceive of examples where civil administrative regulations can be 
designed to remedy the problems of fit, overdeference, and inexpertise, and 
where the burden on the public at large– here, a burden on airlines to install 
locks and ensure that they are used – might be worth the cost of deterrence.   
When this is the case, we are all for it.  However, we do not think 
that there will be many examples of this sort of judicious use of civil 
administrative agencies.  Our claim is a descriptive one, and thus may be 
tested empirically.  Comprehensively doing so is beyond the scope of this 
article, but we think that evaluations of every aspect of the civil 
bureaucracy’s counter-terrorism initiatives would reveal that the vast 
majority of them don’t work – and we have offered a theory about why that 
might be the case. 
 
B The 1% problem  
 
The vice president has suggested that the calamitous, if remote, risk 
of a major terrorist attack justifies high investments in the war on terror.248  
Some call this the 1% doctrine,249 and the idea for our purposes is that the 
one in 100 risk of attack justifies the mobilization of civil administrative 
agencies to combat terrorism, and the imposition of substantial burdens on 
non-terrorists, because it is possible that this mobilization will prevent 
                                                 
247 See, e.g., Brian R. Wahlquist, Slamming The Door On Terrorists And The Drug Trade Whil E Increasing 
Legal Immigration: Temporary Deployment Of The United States Military At The Borders  19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
551, 582 (2005) (“despite multiple hijackings of commercial airliners over the past few decades, little was done to 
reinforce cockpit doors until after September 11”). 
248 The vice president identified this problem in “November of 2001 when the vice president is confronted 
with harrowing intelligence about Pakistani nuclear scientists sitting with (Osama) bin Laden …The vice 
president says that we need to think about these low-probability, high-impact events in a different way …. [that] If 
there is a one percent chance that WMDs essentially have been given to terrorists, we need to treat it as a 
certainty.”  Bill Glauber, Q&A: Suskind on how analysis and action split, 7/16/06 Milwaukee Journal 
& Sentinel at 1 (quoting Ron Suskind). 
249 RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE (2006) (documenting this policy of the administration. 
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calamity. 
It is of course possible to imagine a terrorist strike so horrific that 
almost any cost is worth paying to prevent it – so long, of course, as paying 
that cost will actually prevent the attack.  But it is not at all clear that using 
the civil bureaucracy to lead the fight against terrorists will prevent future 
attacks or even measurably reduce the risk of attack, based on what we’ve 
seen so far.  The false positives have been high, the expenses great, and the 
inefficiencies many.  (The balance of effectiveness and efficiencies in the 
non-civil law enforcement context may be different, and we do not pretend 
to assess those costs here.)  But the 1% argument assumes that the 
government’s bureaucratic counter-terrorism initiatives will in fact be 
effective in preventing, or at least reducing the risk of, terrorism.  And that 
is exactly the point that we contest. 
 By the same token, a 1% assessment of the spectre of a terrorist 
attack in the United States seems far out of proportion to the frequency of 
the attacks that the country has actually experienced.  Of course, this 
forecasting problem is one that may also be tested empirically, and we do 
not claim to do so in this paper. We would have hoped that our government, 
in making this argument in defense of its initiatives, would have felt 
compelled itself to provide some data in support of such sweeping claims.  
But in the absence of any evidence about the likelihood of future attacks, 
we think that while the specter of a terrorist attack may loom large, it is 
hardly an everyday occurrence.  In such a setting, it is unlikely that the civil 
costs incurred by the repurposing of agencies towards terror-fight are worth 
it. 
 
C Agencies Can Do Anything 
 
We have characterized civil administration as a form of governance 
best suited to rules of general applicability and the regulation of volunteers.  
In doing so, we admit that we are painting with a broad brush; we make no 
claim that there is a Platonic ideal of an agency, and that it necessarily 
involves rulemakings and adjudications of volunteers.  It may be that at 
least some agencies can flexibly be reformed to handle atypical or 
idiosyncratic regulatory problems.250  The problem is that they are not being 
so reformed, as exemplified by the examples we have given here.  As with 
the cockpit door objection, our response to the organizational flexibility 
argument is twofold.   
First, here too, we willingly qualify our claim: agencies almost 
                                                 
250 For one approach on how this might be done, see Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A 
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998) 
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never, rather than never ever, are good at fighting terrorism.  We will not 
rule out the possibility that our civil bureaucratic agencies can be efficiently 
and successfully reformed to perform new terrorism-related tasks outside 
their areas of expertise – although we think that will only very rarely be the 
case. 
But, as with the cockpit door objections, in the rare cases that 
agencies can be efficiently reformed to perform counter-terrorism related 
tasks in a way that will meet our three tests of fit, balance between 
discretion and oversight, and expertise, we are all for it. Here, we would 
suggest that perhaps the crucial test is that of expertise.  Lawmakers might 
be able to find ways to enable a given civil agency to target terrorists rather 
than proxy groups and to strike an adequate balance between discretion and 
oversight.  But for most counter-terrorist tasks, expertise will be more 
readily found in agencies and amongst officials that deal with criminal 
matters or law enforcement, such as intelligence analysts and criminal 
investigators, rather than amongst bureaucratic officials such as bank 
regulators and DMV employees, with their expertise in civil matters.  Here, 
as with the other objections, if we take the importance of expertise, fit, and 
adequate supervision seriously, we suspect that only a very few proposed 
reforms, however well intentioned, will meet these tests.   
 
D The Victory Garden Problem 
 
The imposition of burdens on everyone in the war on terror is not 
wholly without appeal.  Making all Americans suffer a bit more when they 
renew their drivers’ licenses may help to unify the country behind an 
antiterrorism policy, and reassure a worried public that something tangible 
is being done to prevent terrorism.251  It may activate a populace in the same 
way that victory gardens252 and war bonds253 have done in wars past – by 
convincing everyone that their subjection to administrative process at least 
means that they are doing their bit.  Moreover, spreading the costs around 
reduces the likelihood of a particularly ugly cost of targeted 
counterterrorism: racial profiling.   
We find the victory garden upside of sending the administrative 
state to war to be uncompelling.  The psychological advantage of appearing 
to having done something, however ineffective, is not at all clear.  As 
anyone who has ever chatted with their neighbor in an airport security line 
                                                 
251 See supra notes ?? and accompanying text. 
252 For an overview see LEWIS A ERENBERG , THE WAR IN AMERICAN CULTURE: SOCIETY AND 
CONSCIOUSNESS DURING WORLD WAR II 17 (!996). 
253 See.,e.g., ANTHONY CRESCENZI, THE STRATEGIC BOND INVESTOR 18 (2002) (“War bonds were crucial 
not only for the role they played in fiancning the war but also in the way they unified the nation.  The sale of war 
bonds became a rallying cry.”). 
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can attest, the American public is not so stupid as to be unable to distinguish 
potentially useful from hopelessly ineffective security measures, and it gets 
little satisfaction from participation in the latter.  Victory garden proponents 
will look hard, in our view, to find any evidence that levels of American 
patriotism have received a boost from longer DMV lines. 
Moreover, the pretense of effective action that a civil administrative 
war on terror or a well-tended victory garden represents is surely open to 
abuse.  Actions that do nothing to win a war may crowd out other actions 
that might work.  And at any rate, the real costs imposed on proxies like 
financial institutions, charities, or people who would like to obtain asylum 
or drivers’ licences, in our view, exceed the intangible benefits of making 
people feel like something is being done. 
The risks of profiling in a more targeted war against terror are 
real,254 but again, as many have observed, efforts to avoid profiling can tend 
to the absurd.  Reversing the efforts of grandmothers who hope to obtain 
drivers’ licenses but lack adequate proof of residence or citizenship imposes 
real costs on a great number of people – far more people than even the most 
pessimistic estimates of the numbers of terrorists seeking drivers’ licenses 
could possible envision.  In the end, we think the match of criminal-style 
law enforcement efforts to deal with the criminal-like law evading efforts of 
potential terrorists better uses the potential of government action (and 
promises the test of criminal process at the end of the government action) 
than does the imposition of broad costs on everyone in the name of getting 
unconventional terrorists fighters in the bureaucracy mobilized.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Administrative agencies like the Treasury Department have been 
unfit, inexpert, and unsupervised in their efforts to detect and deter terrorists 
under the PATRIOT Act, and the new measures introduced by the REAL 
ID Act are likely only to make matters worse by pushing more of our 
unrelated civil agencies into the fray.  Indeed, the agencies we study in 
detail are hardly alone in developing expensive new antiterrorism policies.  
The FDA, for example, has joined them.255  It is, according to a 
                                                 
254 See, e.g., Richard Banks, Essay, Racial Profiling And Antiterrorism Efforts, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1201, 
1201 (2003) (observing that “commentators continue to debate the fairness of the widespread detention, 
deportation, and prosecution of Arabs and Muslims for non-terrorism related offenses. That debate has focused 
partly on the issue of racial profiling”). 
255 Andrea Meyerhoff, Counter-terrorism at FDA, at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/02/slides/3902s1-
04-meyerhoff/ (Oct. 29, 2002).  See  
http://www.fda.gov/oc/opacom/hottopics/bioterrorism.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2006).  See generally, 
Otesa Middleton, FDA Grows to Counter Challenges of Terrorism, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2002, available at 
http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/bioter/fdagrows.html (“Since last year's terror and anthrax attacks, the Food and Drug 
Administration's staff has swelled to record levels … [including] a staff of 10,389, a 10% increase“); James T. 
O’Reilly, Bombing Bureaucratic Complacency: Effects of Counter-Terrorism Pressures Upon Medical Product 
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commissioner, “applying … more resources to counterterrorism in all areas 
of the agency,”256 including the development of a new “Project 
Bioshield”257 and the fast-tracking of an antiterrorism vaccine approval 
process.258  
OSHA advises employers on how best to defend against 
chemical,259 biological,260 and radiation261 terrorism, and requires them to 
address terrorist emergencies through its emergency response program.262  
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), a rate regulator, has 
limited access to its documents,263 and, pursuant to a new statute, set new 
rules for the distribution of gas264 and oil – again all in the name of the war 
on terror.265  Even HUD has gotten into the anti-terrorism game.  Pursuant 
                                                                                                                            
Approvals, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 329, 331 (2004) (as to “the Food & Drug Administration, the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH), and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDCP)…. each is a large and 
complex public health bureaucracy and each has served a distinct, though interrelated, role in the war on 
terrorism”).   
256 Michelle Meadows, The FDA and the Fight Against Terrorism, FDA CONSUMER MAGAZINE, Jan.-Feb. 
2004, available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2004/104_terror.html.  The FDA’s increased efforts generally 
have focused on two defensive measures: preventing willful contamination of all regulated goods and increasing 
the availability of medical products to prevent or treat injuries caused by biological, chemical, or nuclear agents.  
The Food and Drug Law Institute’s 45th Annual Educational Conference Keynote Addresses, 57 FOOD DRUG L.J. 
227, 231 (2002).   
257 Project BioShield Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835 (2004).  Project BioShield has three main 
measures: providing the NIH with new authorities to speed research and development in areas of medical 
countermeasure development; authorizing the use of unapproved medical products during emergencies; and 
mandating the government to maintain a stockpile of vaccines and other medical products to provide for the health 
security of the United States in the event of a bioterrorist attack or other emergency.  Project BioShield Act of 
2004, §§ 2-4. 
258 As the FDA itself noted when it rapidly approved a child dose of an antidote for nerve gas exposure, the 
agency "has placed a high priority in making available safe and effective countermeasures against potential 
terrorist attacks." O’Reilly, supra note _, at 332; Michael Greenberg, Information, Paternalism, and Rational 
Decision-Making: The Balance of FDA Drug Approval, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 663, 667-68 (2003) (“Concerns 
about terrorism are pressing a new set of regulatory reforms at the FDA, designed to speed the development 
pipeline for new products important to national security, and in recognition that such products may be formally 
untestable under the traditional FDA new product approval regime”). 
259 See http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/emergencypreparedness/chemical_sub.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2006).  
260 See http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/emergencypreparedness/biological_sub.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2006). 
261 See http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/emergencypreparedness/radiation_sub.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2006).  
262 Emergency Action Plans, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.38 (2006), available at 
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9726. 
263 Specifically, FERC removed from the public viewing certain documents, such as oversized maps, that 
detail the specifications of energy facilities licensed or certificated under Part I of the Federal Power Act, and 
Section 7(c) of the Natural Gas Act.  See Comm-Opinion-Order, 97 FERC ¶ 61,030 (Oct. 11, 2001); see also 
Patricia McDermott, Information Disclosures by Government: Data Quality and Security Concerns Symposium: 
Withhold and Control: Information in the Bush Administration, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 671, 684-58 (2003) 
(discussing FERC limiting access to information post-9/11). 
264 FERC signed an Interagency Agreement with various agencies, including the Department of Homeland 
Security, to share information, analyses and jointly prepare Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) and safety 
reports for all LNG terminals.  Interagency Agreement Among the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 
United States Coast Guard, and Research and Special Programs Administration for the Safety and Security 
Review of Waterfront Import/Export Liquified natural gas Facilities, Feb. 11, 2004, available at 
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/lng/safety/reports/2004-interagency.pdf.  See FERC, A Guide to Liquified Natural 
Gas: What All Citizens Should Know, available at http://www.ferc.gov/for-citizens/citizen-guides/citz-guide-
lng.pdf (last visited Feb. 21 2006).  
265 Suedeen G. Kelly, Address to the Environmental Regulation, Energy, and Market Symposium, in 15 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 251, 256 (Spring 2005) (FERC commissioner noting that the biggest issue that has 
come to light in the last year and a half since LNG activity has been progressing at FERC has been concern about 
terrorism on tankers and discussing how the Coast Guard actually has jurisdiction over the tankers); Report of the 
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to the Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996, HUD now guarantees loans 
made by financial institutions to assist 501(c)(3) nonprofits that have been 
damaged as a result of arson – or terrorism.266 
 And these new initiatives are only part of the story.  Although the 
new Department of Homeland Security has three primary missions - 
“prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's 
vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage from potential attacks 
and natural disasters,”267 – DHS has extended its terror-fighting mandate to 
anti-counterfeiting measures,268 a Safe School Initiative,269 and the 
regulation of telemarketing.270 State and local governments have also been 
pressed into service in the anti-terrorism cause, on both immigration271 and 
other matters.272 
Civil administrators should be encouraged to lay down their arms in 
the war on terror, pick up their collective bureaucratic pens, and turn back 
to the tasks for which they were intended.  For as we have seen, when these 
agencies pursue terrorists instead of developing their areas of expertise, 
proxies – and ultimately all of us – pay the price of the errors that inevitably 
ensue.  
Of course, this doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t fight terrorists.  
Counter-terrorism policies could be directed through traditional military, 
law enforcement, and intelligence mechanisms.  They could also be directed 
through new, specialized anti-terrorist agencies that operate differently than 
                                                                                                                            
Natural Gas Regulation Committee, 25 Energy L. J. 217, 223 (2004) (discussing FERC’s plan to protect the 
energy infrastructure in the wake of 9/11); Report of the Natural Gas Regulation Committee, 26 Energy L. J. 259, 
275-76 (2005) (discussing FERC activity regarding measures enacted to protect the critical energy infrastructure); 
Jim Rossi, Realizing the Promise of Electricity Deregulation: Moving Public Law Out of the Deference Trap in 
Regulated Industries, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 617, 669 (2005) (suggesting that concerns over the relationship 
between terrorism and oil led to Congress's failed energy bill in 2003). 
266 http://www.hud.gov/sec2.cfm. 
267 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, FAQs, at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/faq.jsp (last visited Feb. 21, 
2006).  
268 As the Congressional Research Service has said, “Another matter extends to the capability of the Secret 
Service to maintain its traditional role in the enforcement of certain financial crimes, such as anti-counterfeiting. 
Such criminal conduct has also become more sophisticated and complex. And combating it may now have to 
compete with new higher priorities and expanded duties in other fields, most markedly in anti-terrorism.”  
Congressional Research Service, Homeland Security Department: FY2006 Appropriations (2005) available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL32863.pdf 
269 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Threats and Protections: Children and Schools, at 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=75 (last visited Feb. 21, 2006).  
270 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Cornerstone – Financial 
Crimes: Safeguarding America Through Financial and Trade Investigations, at 
http://www.ice.gov/graphics/cornerstone/financialcrimes.htm (last modified Nov. 21, 2005). 
271 The 9/11 Commission Report, 81 (Nat’l Comm. on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S., July 22, 2004), 
available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.  Some cities, including New York, have 
traditionally refused to share information with the INS on the immigration status of their citizenry.  See The 9/11 
Commission Report, supra, 475 n.46. 
272 The federal government's Terrorist Information and Prevention System suggests novel uses of the federal 
Militia clause power, including the new prospect of disciplining local counterparts who have refused to cooperate 
in the effort to quash terrorism.  Gill Grantmore, The Phages of American Law, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 455, 472 
(Jan. 2003).  
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traditional civil regulators, much as specialized agencies like the 
Department of Defense operate to pursue the administration of conventional 
wars. Concerns regarding the ultimate value of the war on terrorism writ 
large and the precise approach that these task specific and rationalized 
government actors should take in their anti-terrorism initiatives are, 
however, beyond the scope of this article.   
Rather, we have focused on a different, narrower question: should 
anti-terrorist measures be channeled through our ordinary administrative 
agencies?  We think that, generally, the answer is no.  Involving 
administrative agencies in this war serves no goals but expressive and 
symbolic ones, and at a substantial financial and social cost.  
But public opinion often favors agency action against terrorism, 
however ill advised or futile such action might in fact be.  Our government 
has left us no doubt that it views the war on terror as proceeding on all 
fronts, domestic and international, through the military, through law 
enforcement, and through these ordinary agencies.273   
Realistically, therefore, we feel compelled to answer the “what then” 
question – what if, in spite of the concerns we have raised here, anti-
terrorist measures will nonetheless be directed through administrative 
agencies, for reasons of political expediency, public demand, or symbolic 
significance, if no others?  In our view, if anti-terrorism measures must be 
directed through administrative agencies, the least that we can do is to try to 
minimize the collateral damage such measures cause to our agencies, to 
proxies, and to the American people.   
The most effective way of doing so would be to ensure that those 
measures are good policy anyway – that is, that they would be good policy 
even without the national security purpose that is catalyzing their immediate 
implementation.  To meet the “good policy anyway” test, at a minimum 
such measures should observe three principles: they should fit within the 
core competence of the agency, properly balance discretion with oversight, 
and perhaps most importantly, promote some end that furthers the agency’s 
regulatory responsibilities.   
The driver’s license measures called for by the REAL ID Act 
provide a good example of how current anti-terrorist measures could be 
amended to be “good policy anyway.”  Whether an initiative promotes the 
                                                 
273 Terrorism financing is “A Key Front in a Global War on Terror” as Treasury officials have testified to 
Congress, and warranted inclusion in the president’s state of the union address.  Testimony of Stuart A. Levey, 
Treas. Under Secretary Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, House Banking Ctte., August 23, 2004, available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js1869.htm.  Congressman James Sensenbrenner has declared that "The 
Real ID [Act] is vital to preventing foreign terrorists from hiding in plain sight while conducting their operations 
and planning attacks.”  Dibya Sarkar, REAL ID Zips Through Congress, http://www.fcw.com/article88832-05-11-
05-Web, May 11, 2005. 
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agency’s purpose should be considered according to two concerns: the 
substance of the provision and a cost-benefit analysis of the extent to which 
the provision promotes a core goal in light of the resources it directs away 
from other agency goals.  Here, sharing databases of driver records and 
automobile registrations with other states enables DMVs to more accurately 
enforce driver and automobile safety across state lines and seems likely to 
do so efficiently, without redirecting too many resources from other agency 
initiatives, for it builds from and reinforces existing databases and ongoing 
synchronization efforts in the states.   
In contrast, confirming social security numbers and immigration 
status are directly counterproductive measures that discourage some 
residents, particularly illegal immigrants, from participating in the licensing 
regime.  Because other measures aimed at ensuring security of the cards 
themselves and at confirming identity and reducing identity fraud promote 
the core goal of automobile and driver safety only indirectly, the effect of 
these measures on the agency’s resources and functions generally is crucial: 
very inexpensive measures may nonetheless be worthwhile for their indirect 
effects, but very costly measures like maintaining databases of identity 
documents will certainly direct too many resources away from the agency’s 
core purposes.  
It is perhaps not surprising that there seems to be a connection 
between the goals that are within the core purpose of the agency and the 
tasks that are within its expertise.  Here, activities that undermine the 
DMV’s purpose also tend to be outside its expertise, such as checking 
immigration documents and reviewing social security numbers, as well as 
checking and maintaining databases of identity documents.  Once again, 
maintaining and sharing driver and automobile records forms a notable 
exception, being well within the agency’s area of expertise. 
Ultimately, although the “good policy anyway” test provides a way 
for the government to implement some counter-terrorism measures through 
our civil administrative systems, if it must, the civil bureaucracy is not the 
right place to center the war on terrorism.  Our administrative agencies 
should be left to manage the occaissionally boring but ultimately crucial 
matters that they handle best.    
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